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Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) with a set of tools to address those risks and protect human health
and the environment. In the years since TSCA’s passage, the procedural hurdles and the difficult-to-meet legal
standards built into the statute, along with a court decision rejecting EPA’s use of its authority to ban
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dangerous chemicals. By utilizing certain sections of the statute in new and aggressive ways, EPA can
effectively address chemical risks. Further, this Comment argues that TSCA’s preemption provision affords
states leeway to continue to regulate the use of chemicals within their borders. Though reform of TSCA is
necessary, EPA and states can effectively protect against chemical risks in the near-term by using the full extent
of their authority under the current law.
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HUMAN HEALTH AND THE 
ENVIRONMENT CAN’T WAIT FOR REFORM:  
CURRENT OPPORTUNITIES FOR THE 
FEDERAL GOVERNMENT AND STATES TO 
ADDRESS CHEMICAL RISKS UNDER THE 
TOXIC SUBSTANCES CONTROL ACT 
LAUREN TREVISAN* 
Expressing its concern about growing rates of cancer and other diseases, coupled 
with the lack of data about the effect of the thousands of chemicals used in U.S. society, 
in 1976 Congress enacted the Toxic Substances Control Act (TSCA).  Congress 
intended for TSCA to shed new light on chemical risks and provide the U.S. 
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) with a set of tools to address those risks and 
protect human health and the environment.  In the years since TSCA’s passage, the 
procedural hurdles and the difficult-to-meet legal standards built into the statute, 
along with a court decision rejecting EPA’s use of its authority to ban dangerous 
chemicals, have impeded EPA’s ability to regulate chemical use and manufacture.  
This Comment argues that both the EPA and state governments have the authority to 
act now to address the risks posed by dangerous chemicals.  By utilizing certain 
sections of the statute in new and aggressive ways, EPA can effectively address 
chemical risks.  Further, this Comment argues that TSCA’s preemption provision 
affords states leeway to continue to regulate the use of chemicals within their borders.  
Though reform of TSCA is necessary, EPA and states can effectively protect against 
chemical risks in the near-term by using the full extent of their authority under the 
current law. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Almost thirty years after the passage of the Toxic Substances 
Control Act (TSCA) in 1976,1 a study of the umbilical cords of infants 
born in 2004 found that they contained almost 300 manmade 
chemicals.2  Many of the detected chemicals have been linked to 
                                                          
 1. President Ford signed TSCA into law on October 11, 1976.  See Pub. L. No. 
94-469, 90 Stat. 2003 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 2601–92 (2006)).  
 2. See JANE HOULIHAN ET AL., ENVTL. WORKING GRP., BODY BURDEN:  THE 
POLLUTION IN NEWBORNS 13 (2005), available at http://www.ewg.org/ 
reports_content/bodyburden2/pdf/bodyburden2_final-r2.pdf (recognizing that 
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cancer, birth defects, and developmental abnormalities.3  Congress 
passed TSCA as a precautionary measure—an intended preventative 
regulatory scheme to address the health and environmental risks 
associated with the rapidly increasing presence of chemicals in 
Americans’ daily lives.4  The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency 
(EPA) Administrator at the time, Russell E. Train, described TSCA as 
“a major step toward an increasingly effective preventive approach 
toward the ‘environmental disease’ that has been called the ‘disease 
of the century.’”5  However, three and a half decades later, Congress’s 
attempt at chemical regulation is widely regarded as a failure.6  This 
failure has been attributed to the procedural burdens imposed on 
EPA by the statute itself,7 substantive burdens imposed by both the 
statute and subsequent court interpretations,8 and, until very recently, 
a lack of aggressive implementation on the part of EPA.9 
                                                          
while scientists used to believe that the placenta shielded developing babies from 
most chemicals, recent science has made it clear that “at this critical time when 
organs, vessels, membranes and systems are [formed] . . . the umbilical cord carries 
not only the building blocks of life, but also a steady stream of industrial chemicals, 
pollutants and pesticides”). 
 3. See id. at 13–14 (noting that infants are more susceptible to harm from these 
chemical exposures). 
 4. See TSCA § 2(a), 15 U.S.C. § 2601(a) (2006) (articulating the congressional 
findings that  (1) “human beings and the environment are being exposed each year 
to a large number of chemical[s],” (2) “there are some [chemicals] whose 
manufacture . . . may present an unreasonable risk of injury to health or the 
environment,” and (3) “the effective regulation” of such chemicals requires 
regulation of both interstate and intrastate commerce); see also COUNCIL ON ENVTL. 
QUALITY, TOXIC SUBSTANCES 21 (1971), reprinted in H. COMM. ON INTERSTATE AND 
FOREIGN COMMERCE, 94TH CONG., LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE TOXIC SUBSTANCES 
CONTROL ACT, at 784 (Comm. Print 1976) (“We need no longer be limited to 
repairing damage after it has been done; nor should we allow the general population 
to be used as a laboratory for discovering adverse health effects [of chemical 
exposure].”). 
 5. See Press Release, U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, Train Sees New Toxic Substances 
Law as “Preventative Medicine” (Oct. 21, 1976), http://www.epa.gov/ 
history/topics/tsca/03.html. 
 6. See, e.g., HOULIHAN ET AL., supra note 2, at 33 (characterizing TSCA as “the 
nation’s notoriously weak chemical safety law”); see also James T. O’Reilly, Torture by 
TSCA:  Retrospectives of a Failed Statute, NATURAL RES. & ENV’T, Summer 2010, at 43 
(“TSCA was floated with great ambitions, but it has bombed with tepid results . . . .  
TSCA has failed and left us with a mere façade of effective environmental action.  
Industry in the United States dodged the bullet.”). 
 7. See infra Part I.B.1 (describing the extensive procedures EPA must follow in 
issuing a rule under TSCA in addition to those required under the Administrative 
Procedure Act). 
 8. See Corrosion Proof Fittings v. EPA, 947 F.2d 1201, 1217 (5th Cir. 1991) 
(requiring that EPA perform an extensive quantitative analysis to justify issuing a 
section 6 rule).  But see infra Part II.C (arguing that the court’s interpretation of what 
is required of EPA under section 6 is contrary to both the language of the statute and 
its legislative history). 
 9. Since TSCA was passed, “only five . . . chemicals have been regulated under 
[EPA’s section 6] ban authority.”  The Toxic Chemicals Safety Act of 2010:  Hearing on 
H.R. 5820 Before the Subcomm. on Commerce, Trade, and Consumer Prot. of the H. Comm. on 
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While far from a perfect tool, TSCA remains the only statutory tool 
available to regulate many of the chemicals that enter commerce10—
and subsequently the environment and the human body—every day.  
Reform is necessary to address the procedural and substantive 
obstacles posed by the current law;11 in the meantime, TSCA offers 
opportunities for regulation before a reform bill is enacted.  With 
new chemical risks continually coming to light,12 meaningful 
regulatory action at both the federal and state level is possible, and is 
happening, right now.13 
This Comment argues that by utilizing the full extent of its 
authority under the current statute, EPA can more fully effectuate 
TSCA’s goal of minimizing the risks of dangerous chemicals, and that 
TSCA’s preemption provision allows for state action to regulate 
chemicals to supplement what can be done at the federal level.  This 
Comment begins by presenting the backdrop to which the current 
debate over TSCA is set.  Part I describes the history and purpose of 
TSCA, outlines key sections of the legislation and EPA’s authority 
under those sections, and discusses the main hurdles to TSCA’s 
                                                          
Energy and Commerce, 111th Cong. 2 (2010), available at 
http://democrats.energycommerce.house.gov/documents/20100729/Owens.Testim
ony.07.29.2010.pdf [hereinafter TSCA Hearings] (statement of Steve Owens, Assistant 
Administrator, Office of Chem. Safety and Pollution Prevention, U.S. Envtl. Prot. 
Agency).  However, since 2009, EPA has announced that it is considering using its 
section 6 authority to ban or otherwise limit seven additional chemicals.  See Action 
Plan Fact Sheet, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY (Apr. 2011), http://www.epa.gov/ 
oppt/existingchemicals/pubs/overview.pdf (providing an overview of EPA’s 
“Chemical Action Plans” for ten listed chemicals, seven of which EPA is considering 
banning or restricting under § 6). 
 10. TSCA regulates “‘chemical substance[s],’” a term that is defined very 
expansively in the statute:  it refers to “any organic or inorganic substance.”  TSCA § 
3(2)(A), 15 U.S.C. § 2602(2)(A) (2006).  However, Congress excluded chemicals 
that were already regulated specifically under other statutory schemes; TSCA does 
not apply to pesticides, tobacco, nuclear materials, firearms, and “any food, food 
additive, drug, cosmetic, or device.”  Id. § 3(2)(B)(i)–(vi). 
 11. See infra Part I.C.2 (describing current reform efforts); infra Conclusion 
(concluding that reform is necessary for truly effective chemical management). 
 12. See Bryan Walsh, The Perils of Plastic, TIME, Apr. 1, 2010, 
http://www.time.com/time/specials/packages/article/0,28804,1976909_1976908,00
.html (“Since World War II, production of industrial chemicals has risen rapidly, and 
the U.S. generates or imports some 42 billion lb. (19 billion kg) of them per day. . . .  
Those chemicals have a habit of finding their way out of everyday products and into 
the environment—and ultimately into living organisms.”).   
 13. See Enhancing EPA’s Chemical Management Program, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, 
http://www.epa.gov/oppt/existingchemicals/pubs/enhanchems.html (last updated 
Sept. 14, 2011) (laying out EPA’s plans for more aggressive use of its TSCA authority:  
“EPA is initiating a comprehensive approach to enhance the Agency’s current 
chemicals management program within the limits of existing authorities”).  See 
generally MIKE BELLIVEAU, SAFER CHEMS. HEALTHY FAMILIES, HEALTHY STATES:  
PROTECTING FAMILIES FROM TOXIC CHEMICALS WHILE CONGRESS LAGS BEHIND (2010), 
available at http://www.saferchemicals.org/PDF/reports/HealthyStates.pdf 
(analyzing state efforts to regulate chemicals in the absence of federal regulation). 
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implementation.  It completes the picture by giving an overview of 
the current landscape, including descriptions of state law responses 
to TSCA’s failures, the two principal proposed TSCA reform bills, and 
EPA’s current plans to make the most of its TSCA authority. 
Part II argues that, by utilizing the full extent of its existing 
authority, EPA currently has the ability to make TSCA better serve its 
purpose in the near term.  EPA has proposed a number of aggressive 
new actions that this Comment argues are well within the Agency’s 
current authority and are likely to withstand any post-implementation 
court challenges.  Part III then argues that TSCA’s preemption 
provision affords states leeway to regulate chemicals within their 
borders even more expansively than EPA can, thus supplementing 
what can be done at the federal level.  This Comment concludes by 
recommending that TSCA be reformed to remove the procedural 
and substantive obstacles under the current law, thus allowing EPA to 
regulate chemical risks even more effectively and efficiently.  This 
would in turn reduce the need for the current patchwork of state 
regulation. 
I. BACKGROUND 
Congress passed TSCA in 1976 to address two significant regulatory 
gaps:  the lack of information about the risks of chemicals14 and the 
absence of authority to address and minimize those risks.15  However, 
significant hurdles to TSCA’s implementation resulted in these needs 
going largely unmet.16  In response to these hurdles and a growing 
consensus that TSCA has failed to live up to its mandates, TSCA 
reform has become a major discussion point among stakeholders.17  
The evolution of TSCA from its promising beginnings, to its 
                                                          
 14. See TSCA § 2(b) (“It is the policy of the United States that—(1) adequate 
data should be developed with respect to the effect of chemical substances . . . on 
health and the environment . . . .”). 
 15. See id. § 2(b)(2) (“[A]dequate authority should exist to regulate chemical 
substances . . . which present an unreasonable risk of injury to health or the 
environment . . . .”). 
 16. See infra Part I.B (identifying the procedural, legal standard, and judicial 
review obstacles that have impeded EPA’s ability to effectively regulate under TSCA). 
 17. See, e.g., John S. Applegate, Synthesizing TSCA and REACH:  Practical Principles 
for Chemical Regulation Reform, 35 ECOLOGY L.Q. 721, 765 (2008) (advocating that “if 
TSCA is to be truly preventive, TSCA reform must incorporate provisions that 
expressly permit EPA to act in advance of full information”); Malcolm D. Woolf, Why 
Modernization of the U.S. Toxic Substances Law is Good for Public Health and Business, 
SUSTAINABLE DEV. L. & POL’Y, Spring 2006, at 4 (describing the reasons why TSCA 
should be reformed from the perspective of both public health advocates and 
chemical manufacturers).  
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ineffectiveness in practice, and to its proposed reform, is discussed 
below. 
A. Purpose and Scope of TSCA 
TSCA was enacted during what has been described as “the most 
active phase of federal environmental law-making this country has 
ever seen.”18  The central purpose of TSCA is to prevent the 
“unreasonable risk” of injury to human health or the environment 
due to chemical manufacturing and use.19  TSCA’s introduction was 
spurred by the 1971 report Toxic Substances, which was prepared by 
the newly established Council on Environmental Quality (CEQ).20  
On the basis of available data and growing fears about the unknown 
dangers posed by largely unregulated chemicals, this report made a 
series of straightforward findings that were the impetus for TSCA’s 
introduction and passage:  (1) toxic substances were entering the 
environment; (2) the effects of these substances were largely 
unknown and potentially severe; (3) existing legal mechanisms were 
not suited to address these effects; and (4) new legal authority was 
required.21  In February 1971, a new legal authority was proposed:  
President Nixon submitted to Congress a version of the bill that 
would become TSCA.22  After five years of debate and fifteen days of 
hearings,23 TSCA emerged in its current form and was signed into law 
in October 1976.24  
This Comment will analyze three primary tools delegated to EPA by 
TSCA to accomplish Congress’s stated intent:  (1) section 4 testing 
authority, (2) section 5 notice requirements, and (3) section 6 
authority to limit or ban a chemical substance.  The following 
                                                          
 18. David Markell, An Overview of TSCA, Its History and Key Underlying Assumptions, 
and Its Place in Environmental Regulation, 32 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 333, 334 (2010); see 
also id. at 334 n.6 (observing that the majority of major environmental laws, including 
the Clean Air Act, the Clean Water Act, and the National Environmental Policy Act 
were enacted in the 1970s). 
 19. See TSCA § 2(b) (“It is the policy of the United States that . . . adequate 
authority should exist to regulate chemical substances and mixtures which present 
an unreasonable risk of injury to health or the environment . . . .” (emphasis added)). 
 20. See generally COUNCIL ON ENVTL. QUALITY, supra note 4 (detailing the dangers 
posed by toxic substances and calling for regulation). 
 21. See id. at 759–60. 
 22. Id. at 761.  TSCA was proposed before Toxic Substances was published in April 
1971 because the pressing nature of the findings necessitated that CEQ resources be 
diverted to writing the legislation before the report could be finalized.  Id. at 758. 
 23. S. REP. NO. 94-698, at 3 (1976), reprinted in H. COMM. ON INTERSTATE AND 
FOREIGN COMMERCE, 94TH CONG., LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE TOXIC SUBSTANCES 
CONTROL ACT, at 159 (Comm. Print 1976).  
 24. Pub. L. No. 94-469, 90 Stat. 2003 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 2601–
92 (2006)).  
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subsections provide a brief overview of these three provisions of 
TSCA, and Part II addresses courts’ interpretations of the features of 
these provisions.25 
1. Section 4:  Authority to require testing of chemicals 
Section 4 of TSCA establishes EPA’s authority to require testing of 
chemical substances.26  EPA exercises this authority by issuing a rule 
requiring the manufacturers of certain chemicals to perform a series 
of tests to determine the chemicals’ health and environmental effects 
(hereinafter known as a “test rule”).27  In enacting TSCA, Congress 
declared that “this provision would no longer allow the public or the 
environment to be used as a testing ground for the safety of 
[chemical] products.”28 
Section 4(a) of TSCA provides EPA with two separate bases on 
which it can require testing of chemical substances.  Under section 
4(a)(1)(A), EPA can require testing for chemicals that “may present 
an unreasonable risk of injury to health or the environment.”29  
Alternatively, under section 4(a)(1)(B), EPA can mandate that 
manufacturers test chemicals for which there is insufficient 
information to determine whether the chemical presents a risk to 
health or the environment, and thus testing is needed to “develop 
such data.”30  EPA can use its section 4(a)(1)(B) authority to fill in 
data gaps for chemicals that are (1) “produced in substantial 
quantities,” and (2) either “enter the environment in substantial 
quantities” or will result in “substantial human exposure” to the 
chemical.31 
In Chemical Manufacturers Association v. EPA,32 the United States 
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that EPA has discretion to 
determine the quantities of chemical production and the levels of 
human exposure that rise to the level of being “substantial,” such that 
                                                          
 25. The legal standards that EPA must meet to use its authority under these three 
provisions are also discussed in Part I.B (in the context of hurdles to 
implementation).  Part II discusses these sections in the context of opportunities for 
EPA to use relevant provisions to effectuate TSCA’s stated purpose. 
 26. TSCA § 4, 15 U.S.C. § 2603 (2006) (entitled “Testing of chemical substances 
and mixtures”). 
 27. See id. § 4(a) (stating that once the requisite findings have been made with 
respect to a chemical or mixture, “the Administrator shall by rule require that testing 
be conducted on such substance or mixture”). 
 28. S. REP. NO. 94-698, at 3.  
 29. See TSCA § 4(a)(1)(A)(i) (limiting testing to chemicals whose health and 
environmental effects cannot be determined with existing information). 
 30. Id. § 4(a)(1)(B). 
 31. See id. 
 32. 899 F.2d 344 (5th Cir. 1990). 
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they trigger EPA’s section 4(a)(1)(B) authority.33  In that case, the 
Chemical Manufacturers Association (CMA) challenged a rule that 
EPA issued requiring manufacturers of the chemical cumene “to 
perform certain toxicological testing . . . to determine [cumene’s] 
health and environmental effects.”34  CMA argued that EPA’s estimate 
of the quantity of cumene that entered the environment was too 
high.35  It urged the court to accept its considerably lower estimate of 
cumene emissions and accordingly find that there was not a 
“substantial quantity” of cumene entering the environment.36 
The Fifth Circuit held that while EPA’s estimate was supported by 
substantial evidence,37 because neither TSCA nor its legislative history 
define what amount of a chemical constitutes a “substantial quantity,” 
the court could not determine whether the amount of cumene 
emissions presented by EPA was sufficient to trigger its statutory 
authority.38  Further, because “substantial quantity” and substantial 
human or environmental exposure were left undefined in the statute, 
the court held that Congress had delegated the authority to define 
and interpret these terms to EPA.39  Accordingly, the Fifth Circuit 
rejected CMA’s construction of what amount constituted a 
“substantial quantity,” and remanded the case to EPA to define the 
term “substantial” within section 4(a)(1)(B), noting that EPA has 
“considerable latitude” and “[r]oom must be left for the exercise of 
judgment” in complying with the court’s mandate.40 
Though the Fifth Circuit did not cite to the Supreme Court’s 
decision in Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 
Inc.,41 the logic of the Court’s decision in Chevron underlies the 
reasoning applied in Chemical Manufacturers.  In Chevron, the Supreme 
Court held that where “Congress has not directly addressed the 
precise question at issue,” in a statute, but rather has explicitly “left a 
gap for the agency to fill,” the reviewing court shall not overturn an 
agency’s interpretation unless it is “arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly 
contrary to the statute.”42  In a later decision, the Supreme Court 
                                                          
 33. Id. at 359. 
 34. Id. at 346. 
 35. Id. at 352. 
 36. Id. 
 37. Id.; see also TSCA § 19(c)(1)(B)(i), 15 U.S.C. § 2618(c)(1)(B)(i) (2006) 
(setting a substantial evidence standard of review based on the rulemaking record for 
section 4 test rules). 
 38. Chem. Mfrs., 899 F.2d at 354. 
 39. See id. (noting that the court must accept EPA interpretations that are 
rational and consistent with the statute). 
 40. See id. at 359–60. 
 41. 467 U.S. 837 (1984). 
 42. See id. at 843–44 (adding that for instances when Congress implicitly 
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clarified that the level of deference afforded to agency 
interpretations under its opinion in Chevron was reserved for areas of 
a statute where the agency had the authority to speak with the force 
of law, such as the rulemaking authority set out by Congress in 
section 4(a)(1)(B).43 
Thus, in accordance with the Fifth Circuit’s holding in Chemical 
Manufacturers and the principles from the Supreme Court’s holding 
in Chevron, in 1993 EPA published guidance in the Federal Register 
describing the criteria it would use to determine when a test rule 
issued pursuant to section 4(a)(1)(B) is necessary (hereinafter 
“guidance document”).44  EPA defined the term “substantial quantity” 
of a chemical for the purposes of triggering section 4(a)(1)(B) of 
TSCA as greater than or equal to one million pounds, in reference to 
both chemical production levels as well as the amount of a chemical 
released into the environment.45  Due to the intricacies of defining a 
term as vague and potentially far-reaching as “substantial human 
exposure,”46 EPA defined what constitutes “substantial human 
exposure” for various situations:  more than 100,000 people for the 
general population; more than 10,000 people for consumers; and 
more than 1000 people for workers.47  In setting these quantities, EPA 
exercised the interpretive discretion that Congress granted it in 
having “left a gap for the agency to fill”48 in section 4(a)(1)(B), as 
recognized by the Fifth Circuit in Chemical Manufacturers.49 
                                                          
delegates authority, courts should not disturb an agency’s “reasonable 
interpretation[s] of statutory provisions”). 
 43. See United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 226–27 (2001) (offering 
administrative adjudication and notice-and-comment rulemaking as examples of 
congressional intent to delegate an agency authority to make rules with the force of 
law). 
 44. TSCA Section 4(a)(1)(B) Final Statement of Policy; Criteria for Evaluating 
Substantial Production, Substantial Release, and Substantial or Significant Human 
Exposure, 58 Fed. Reg. 28,736 (May 14, 1993). 
 45. See id. at 28,746 (“EPA believes a threshold value of 1 million pounds is a 
reasonable interpretation of the phrase ‘produced in substantial quantities’ in TSCA 
section 4(a)(1)(B)(i)[,] [and] EPA believes that [1 million pounds] is a reasonable 
interpretation of the phrase ‘enters the environment in substantial quantities’ in 
TSCA section 4(a)(1)(B)(i)(I).”). 
 46. See Chem. Mfrs. Ass’n v. EPA, 899 F.2d 344, 359 (5th Cir. 1990) (“We 
recognize that ‘substantial’ is an inherently imprecise word.  We are also aware that . 
. . no definition or group of criteria can be established which will function like a 
mathematical formula, so that for every given set of facts a specific, predictable 
answer will always be forthcoming.”). 
 47. Id.   
 48. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843 
(1984). 
 49. See Chem. Mfrs., 899 F.2d at 346 (indicating that TSCA authorized EPA to 
promulgate test rules). 
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2. Section 5:  Notice of chemical production and potential for regulation 
Where section 4 is predominantly about chemical testing, section 5 
of TSCA requires manufacturers to give EPA notice before they begin 
producing a new chemical or producing an existing chemical that 
will be put to a new use.50  This section reflects Congress’s rationale 
that “[t]he most effective and efficient time to prevent unreasonable 
risks to public health or the environment is prior to first 
manufacture.”51  In addition to requiring that manufacturers give 
EPA advance notice of chemical production, section 5(b)(4)(A) of 
TSCA states that EPA can issue a rule listing chemicals that EPA finds 
“present[] or may present an unreasonable risk of injury to health or 
the environment.”52  In determining whether to make such a list, and 
which chemicals to add, TSCA dictates that EPA weigh “all relevant 
factors,” explicitly requiring EPA to consider the chemical 
substance’s health effects, as well the degree of environmental 
exposure to the chemical.53  
The term “unreasonable risk” is not defined in the statute54 and has 
not been addressed by courts in the context of section 5 of TSCA.55  
However, courts have interpreted this term in relation to section 4 of 
TSCA.56  The language in the statute triggering a section 4(a)(1)(A) 
test rule and a section 5(b)(4)(A) rule similarly permits EPA to issue 
a rule where a chemical “may present an unreasonable risk of injury 
to health or the environment.”57  The Supreme Court has held that 
                                                          
 50. See TSCA § 5(a), 15 U.S.C. § 2604(a) (2006) (requiring that manufacturers of 
new chemicals or existing chemicals put to “a significant new use” must provide EPA 
with ninety days notice before the chemical can be manufactured). 
 51. See S. REP. NO. 94-698, at 5 (1976), reprinted in H. COMM. ON INTERSTATE AND 
FOREIGN COMMERCE, 94TH CONG., LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE TOXIC SUBSTANCES 
CONTROL ACT, at 161 (Comm. Print 1976). 
 52. TSCA § 5(b)(4)(A)(i) (emphasis added). 
 53. Id. § 5(b)(4)(A)(ii). 
 54. See id. § 3 (failing to include a definition of “unreasonable risk” in this 
“definitions” section of the statute).  
 55. See infra text accompanying notes 208–209 (explaining that because EPA has 
never used section 5(b)(4)(A), there is no precedent defining this term). 
 56. See, e.g., Chem. Mfrs. Ass’n v. EPA, 859 F.2d 977, 984 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (ruling 
that EPA can issue a test rule when its findings provide a “substantial” or “more-than-
theoretical” basis for determining that a chemical “may present” an “unreasonable 
risk” exists); Ausimont U.S.A. Inc. v. EPA, 838 F.2d 93, 97 (3d Cir. 1988) (upholding 
a test rule where “an existing possibility of harm raise[d] reasonable and legitimate 
cause for concern”). 
 57. Compare TSCA § 5(b)(4)(A)(i) (“The Administrator may, by rule, compile 
and keep current a list of chemical substances with respect to which the 
Administrator finds that the manufacture, processing, distribution in commerce, use, 
or disposal, or any combination of such activities, presents or may present an 
unreasonable risk of injury to health or the environment.” (emphasis added)), with id. § 
4(a) (“If the Administrator finds that—the manufacture, distribution in commerce, 
processing, use, or disposal of a chemical substance or mixture, or that any 
combination of such activities, may present an unreasonable risk of injury to health or the 
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when interpreting an undefined statutory term that appears in 
multiple places in the same statute, courts are to presume that the 
meaning is the same in each instance.58  While this presumption can 
be overcome by a finding that Congress intended that words be given 
different meanings,59 Part II.B argues that here, the term 
“unreasonable risk” should be interpreted in the same manner in 
both the section 4(a)(1)(A) and section 5(b)(4)(A) contexts, and 
thus section 4(a)(1)(A) precedent is illustrative of how courts would 
interpret this term as used in section 5(b)(4)(A).60 
In reviewing a challenge to a 4(a)(1)(A) test rule, the United States 
Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit observed in Chemical 
Manufacturers Association v. EPA61 that in the absence of an indication 
as to level of “unreasonable risk” that EPA must find before 
regulating a chemical, Congress left it to EPA to determine whether 
and to what degree a chemical poses “unreasonable risk” such that 
regulation is necessary.62  As stated by the Supreme Court in Chevron, 
if Congress does not address an issue in the statute, such as the 
definition of “unreasonable risk,” then courts should look to an 
agency’s construction of the term and uphold it so long as it is 
reasonable.63  Specifically, the Chevron Court determined that “[i]f 
Congress has explicitly left a gap for the agency to fill [in the 
statute],” then Congress expressly delegated to the agency the 
authority to “elucidate” the meaning of the statute in its regulation.64 
Applying the Supreme Court’s analysis from Chevron, the D.C. 
Circuit upheld EPA’s construction of “unreasonable risk” as requiring 
that EPA only show that the risk is “more-than-theoretical,” as 
opposed to being “more likely than not,” as argued for by the 
Chemical Manufacturers Association.65  The court’s ultimate holding, 
                                                          
environment . . . [along with additional requirements] the Administrator shall by rule 
require that testing be conducted . . . .”(emphasis added)). 
 58. See Envtl. Def. v. Duke Energy Corp., 549 U.S. 561, 574 (2007). 
 59. See id. (acknowledging that context can compel interpreting the same word 
in a different way). 
 60. See infra Part II.B. 
 61. 859 F.2d 977 (D.C. Cir. 1988).  Although this case involved the same parties 
and has the same name as the Fifth Circuit case discussed above in Part I.A.1, this 
D.C. Circuit litigation was wholly distinct from the Fifth Circuit litigation.  I have 
attempted to clearly differentiate between the two cases. 
 62. Id. at 984. 
 63. See Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843–
44 (1984). 
 64. Id.  
 65. See Chem. Mfrs., 859 F.2d at 985 (noting that the legislative history of TSCA 
“not only shows that ‘unreasonable risk’ need not be a matter of absolute certainty; it 
shows the reasonableness of EPA’s conclusion that ‘unreasonable risk’ need not be 
established to a more-probable-than-not degree”). 
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which it noted was supported by the findings of other circuits,66 was 
that EPA has the authority to issue a section 4 rule so long as it has a 
“more-than-theoretical basis” for believing that there is some level of 
human exposure to the chemical at issue and the chemical is toxic 
enough at that level to create an “unreasonable risk of injury” to 
human health.67 
Courts determine whether to uphold EPA’s finding that a chemical 
presents an “unreasonable risk” using the substantial evidence 
standard of review.68  In Ausimont U.S.A. Inc. v. EPA,69 the United 
States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reviewed a challenge to 
a section 4(a)(1)(A) test rule and described what a substantial 
evidence review of EPA’s finding of unreasonable risk looks like:  
“[H]ere we look to see if the Administrator produced substantial 
evidence to demonstrate not fact, but doubt and uncertainty.”70  
Similar to both the D.C. Circuit and Fifth Circuit Chemical 
Manufacturers cases, the Third Circuit held that where EPA has 
supported its findings with scientific studies, and the challengers to 
the rule have not shown fundamental or fatal flaws in these studies, 
EPA has met its burden of proving the “unreasonable risk” of a 
chemical substance.71 
3. Section 6:  The authority to ban or otherwise limit chemical substances 
Section 6 is TSCA’s most aggressive provision, providing EPA with 
the authority to impose a range of restrictions, from labeling 
requirements to a complete ban.72  To issue a section 6 rule, EPA 
must first find “that there is a reasonable basis to conclude that” the 
production of a chemical “will present an unreasonable risk of injury 
to health or the environment.”73  EPA then “shall by rule apply one or 
more [listed regulatory] requirements to such substance or mixture 
to the extent necessary to protect adequately against such risk using 
                                                          
 66. See Ausimont U.S.A. Inc. v. EPA, 838 F.2d 93, 97 (3d Cir. 1988) (upholding a 
test rule where “an existing possibility of harm raises reasonable and legitimate cause 
for concern”); Shell Chem. Co. v. EPA, 826 F.2d 295, 298 (5th Cir. 1987) (remanding 
to explore additional evidence without deciding how strong a showing of 
“unreasonable risk” must be to warrant a test rule). 
 67. Chem. Mfrs., 859 F.2d at 987–88 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 68. TSCA § 19(c)(1)(B)(i), 15 U.S.C. § 2618(c)(1)(B)(i) (2006); see also Chem. 
Mfrs., 859 F.2d at 991–92 (observing that the standard of review for TSCA regulations 
is more stringent than for agency decisions under other statutes). 
 69. 838 F.2d 93 (3d Cir. 1988). 
 70. Id. at 96. 
 71. Id. at 96–97. 
 72. TSCA § 6(a). 
 73. Id. 
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the least burdensome requirements.”74  EPA has used its authority 
under section 6 to regulate only five chemicals since TSCA was 
enacted; as a basis for comparison, there are over 84,000 chemicals 
listed in EPA’s TSCA inventory.75  EPA’s limited use of its section 6 
authority has largely been attributed to the Fifth Circuit’s rejection of 
its section 6 ban on asbestos, despite this chemical’s status as a known 
carcinogen.76 
B. Hurdles to Implementation 
When Congress passed TSCA, EPA Administrator Russell Train 
stated that EPA was “ready to start carrying out [its] responsibilities 
under the law openly and effectively.”77  Thirty-three years later, in 
2009, the current Administrator of EPA, Lisa Jackson, noted that 
people are still turning to EPA for “assurance that chemicals have 
been assessed using the best available science, and that unacceptable 
risks haven’t been ignored,” yet EPA is unable to provide this 
assurance under the current law.78  TSCA’s implementation to date 
has led to the statute’s characterization as an “inadequate tool” for 
protecting the public and the environment from chemical risks.79  
The three primary reasons for this are discussed below. 
1. Procedural obstacles 
For EPA to use its authority to require testing under section 4, 
certain aspects of its notice-related authority under section 5, as well 
as its authority to ban or limit chemicals under section 6, EPA must 
issue a rule and in doing so, comply with extensive procedural 
requirements.80  In executing its authority under these provisions, 
                                                          
 74. Id. 
 75. See TSCA Hearings, supra note 9, at 2 (statement of Steve Owens, Assistant 
Administrator, Office of Chem. Safety and Pollution Prevention, U.S. Envtl. Prot. 
Agency) (lamenting EPA’s lack of success in regulating only a small portion of the 
chemicals listed in EPA’s inventory); see also U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, 
GAO-05-458, CHEMICAL REGULATION:  OPTIONS EXIST TO IMPROVE EPA’S ABILITY TO 
ASSESS HEALTH RISKS AND MANAGE ITS CHEMICAL REVIEW PROGRAM 58–60 (2005) 
(listing the five chemicals which EPA has regulated under section 6, all of which 
occurred before the Fifth Circuit’s decision in Corrosion Proof Fittings v. EPA).   
 76. See Corrosion Proof Fittings v. EPA, 947 F.2d 1201, 1229–30 (5th Cir. 1991) 
(rejecting EPA’s asbestos ban, while also acknowledging the hazards of asbestos use). 
 77. Press Release, U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, supra note 5. 
 78. Lisa Jackson, Administrator, U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, Remarks to the 
Commonwealth Club of San Francisco (Sept 29, 2009), http://yosemite.epa.gov/ 
opa/admpress.nsf/a883dc3da7094f97852572a00065d7d8/fc4e2a8c05343b32852576
40007081c5!OpenDocument. 
 79. Id. (noting that TSCA has “been proven an inadequate tool for providing the 
protection against chemical risks that the public rightfully expects”). 
 80. TSCA §§ 4(b)(5), 5(b)(4)(C), 6(c)(2)–(3), 15 U.S.C. §§ 2603(b)(5), 
2604(b)(4)(C), 2605(c)(2)–(3) (2006). 
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EPA must follow both the Administrative Procedure Act’s (APA’s) 
rulemaking requirements, as well as an additional set of requirements 
that Congress added to those already imposed by the APA.81  Since 
TSCA’s passage, administrative law scholars have observed that courts 
have applied and interpreted the APA’s rulemaking requirements to 
require strict adherence to numerous procedures, rendering the 
rulemaking process increasingly rigid and complicated, even 
“ossified.”82  Because TSCA’s procedural requirements are even more 
extensive than the procedures required by the APA, TSCA has been 
called the “ne plus ultra of ossification.”83  EPA has lamented the fact 
that TSCA’s extensive procedural requirements render the use of its 
available regulatory tools “cumbersome and time-consuming.”84 
2. Difficult substantive legal standards 
In addition to procedural hurdles, the legal standards contained in 
the statute itself also constrain EPA’s ability to address chemical risks.  
In enacting TSCA, Congress intended to protect against 
“unreasonable” risks to health and the environment, adopting what 
has been described as a “probabilistic approach” to the meaning of 
risk.85  Accordingly, TSCA does not instruct EPA to regulate to 
prevent all risks, but just risks that it determines are “unreasonable.”86  
This standard is in stark contrast to Congress’s approach in other 
preventative regulatory schemes, such as the Delaney Clause of the 
Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act.87  That clause protects against 
any risk that a regulated product causes cancer, whether the risk is 
minute or considerable.88 
Congress’s approach in TSCA inherently limits EPA’s authority to 
regulate chemicals by requiring EPA to first make a finding that a 
                                                          
 81. See, e.g., id. § 5(b)(4)(C) (“Any rule promulgated under subparagraph (A) . . 
. shall be promulgated pursuant to the procedures specified in section 553 of title 5 
[of the APA], except that (i) the Administrator shall give interested persons an 
opportunity for the oral presentation of data, views, or arguments, in addition to an 
opportunity to make written submissions, (ii) a transcript shall be kept of any oral 
presentation, and (iii) the Administrator shall make and publish with the rule the 
finding described in subparagraph (A).”). 
 82. See Thomas O. McGarity, Some Thoughts on “Deossifying” the Rulemaking Process, 
41 DUKE L.J. 1385, 1385–86 (1992) (observing how “agencies are beginning to seek 
out alternative . . . regulatory vehicles to circumvent the increasingly stiff and 
formalized structures of the informal rulemaking process”). 
 83. Applegate, supra note 17, at 766. 
 84. Jackson, supra note 78. 
 85. Applegate, supra note 17, at 728 (emphasis in original omitted). 
 86. Id. (emphasis in original omitted). 
 87. Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act § 409(c)(3)(A), 21 U.S.C. § 
348(c)(3)(A) (2006). 
 88. See id. (“[N]o additive shall be deemed to be safe if it is found to induce 
cancer when ingested by man or animal . . . .”). 
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chemical poses an “unreasonable risk” before using its authority to 
ban or limit the chemical.89  Further, for EPA to use its authority 
under section 6—where EPA’s strongest authority under TSCA lies—
after finding that a chemical poses an “unreasonable risk,” Congress 
requires EPA to regulate “to protect adequately against such risk 
using the least burdensome requirements.”90  Accordingly, Steve Owens, 
the EPA official who oversees the Agency’s TSCA implementation, 
noted that “[e]ven if EPA has substantial data and wants to protect 
the public against known risks, the law creates obstacles to quick and 
effective regulatory action.”91 
3. Invasive judicial review:  Corrosion Proof Fittings v. EPA 
Unless stated otherwise, federal agencies’ uses of their statutorily 
granted discretion are reviewed under the APA’s “arbitrary and 
capricious” standard of review.92  This standard applies to most 
environmental laws; however, Congress chose to require courts to 
apply a different standard to TSCA.93  Section 19 of TSCA requires 
courts to set aside rules issued by EPA “if the court finds that the rule 
is not supported by substantial evidence in the rulemaking record.”94  
The “substantial evidence” standard applies to test rules promulgated 
pursuant to section 4, a rule listing dangerous chemicals under 
section 5, and rules regulating chemicals under section 6.95 
In Corrosion Proof Fittings v. EPA,96 the Fifth Circuit noted that under 
the “substantial evidence” standard of review, even if the challenger 
to a rule’s assertions has a solid evidentiary backing, the court will not 
overturn the rule as long as “substantial evidence to support [EPA]’s 
decision” to issue the rule exists.97  The court also noted that the 
substantial evidence standard of review “‘afford[s] a considerably 
                                                          
 89. See TSCA § 6(a), 15 U.S.C. § 2605(a) (2006) (stating that EPA can only 
regulate a chemical substance under section 6 where it “finds that there is a 
reasonable basis to conclude that the manufacture, processing, distribution in 
commerce, use, or disposal of a chemical substance . . . presents or will present an 
unreasonable risk of injury to health or the environment” (emphasis added)). 
 90. Id. (emphasis added). 
 91. TSCA Hearings, supra note 9, at 2 (statement of Steve Owens, Assistant 
Administrator, Office of Chem. Safety and Pollution Prevention, U.S. Envtl. Prot. 
Agency). 
 92. See APA § 10(b), 5 U.S.C. § 706 (2006) (“The reviewing court shall . . . hold 
unlawful and set aside agency action, findings, and conclusions found to be . . . 
arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law . 
. . .”). 
 93. TSCA § 19(c). 
 94. Id. § 19(c)(1)(B)(i). 
 95. Id. § 19(c)(1)(A) (limiting judicial review under this standard to actions 
taken under sections 4(a), 5(a)(2), 5(b)(4), 6(a), 6(e), and 7). 
 96. 947 F.2d 1201 (5th Cir. 1991). 
 97. Id. at 1213. 
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more generous judicial review’ than the arbitrary and capricious 
test.”98  This more generous review requires the reviewing court to 
strike a balance:  the court must carefully scrutinize the agency’s 
findings, while showing deference to decisions that are based on the 
agency’s specific areas of knowledge and experience.99 
In Corrosion Proof Fittings, the court reviewed a challenge to a rule 
issued by EPA pursuant to section 6 of TSCA banning the 
“manufacture, importation, processing, and distribution of asbestos 
in almost all products.”100  The challengers to EPA’s rule alleged that 
it was not based on substantial evidence and should therefore be 
overturned.101  In evaluating the record presented by EPA, the court 
applied an invasive review of EPA’s legal obligations under section 6, 
which authorizes EPA to regulate a chemical so long as it has a 
reasonable basis to conclude that the chemical “will present an 
unreasonable risk of injury to health or the environment.”102  Section 
6 further requires EPA to use “the least burdensome requirements” 
to protect against that risk.103 
The court observed that by choosing to ban asbestos, the most 
stringent of EPA’s regulatory options under section 6, “EPA assigned 
to itself the toughest burden in satisfying TSCA’s requirement that its 
alternative be the least burdensome of all those offered to it.”104  The 
court noted that much of the analysis on which EPA based its 
decision was correct; this analysis included EPA’s consideration and 
rejection of other regulatory options, such as labeling, because these 
options still exposed the public to too much risk.105  However, the 
court’s concern was not with the analysis itself, but with EPA’s 
methodology.106  In evaluating the manner in which EPA carried out 
its section 6 analysis, the court recognized that TSCA required EPA 
not only to show that “its proposed action reduce[d] the risk of the 
[chemical] to an adequate level, but also that the actions Congress 
identified as less burdensome also would not do the job.”107  The 
court then went a step further, requiring that EPA use cost-benefit 
analysis to make this showing, which the Agency had failed to do.108 
                                                          
 98. Id. at 1214 (citing Abbott Labs. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136 (1967)). 
 99. Id. 
 100. Id. at 1207. 
 101. Id. 
 102. TSCA § 6(a), 15 U.S.C. § 2605(a) (2006). 
 103. Id. 
 104. Corrosion Proof Fittings, 947 F.2d at 1216. 
 105. Id. at 1216. 
 106. Id.  
 107. Id. at 1217. 
 108. See id. (“Upon an initial showing of product danger, the proper course for 
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Thus, despite the fact that asbestos was a known carcinogen and 
that EPA had spent ten years compiling evidence to support its ban, 
the court found that EPA failed to provide substantial evidence that it 
had chosen the “least burdensome requirement,”109 and that its 
actions were intended to prevent an “unreasonable risk.”110  The 
immediate result of the court’s review was that it remanded the 
asbestos rule to EPA.111  The long-term result of this decision, 
however, is that EPA has since never used its section 6 authority to 
successfully ban a chemical.112 
C. The Current Landscape 
Despite its flaws, TSCA’s main title has never been amended.113  
While EPA struggled to implement TSCA’s main provisions, states 
chose to take matters into their own hands, passing state laws 
regulating chemicals as increasing numbers of threats from chemical 
substances came to light.114  Congress, on the other hand, made little 
progress to change TSCA until 2009, when the United States House 
of Representatives and Senate both seriously considered legislation 
that would substantially reform the current law.115  In addition to 
advocating for reform, in 2009 the Obama Administration EPA 
announced its intention to chart a new path under the current 
statute, pledging to aggressively enforce its existing TSCA authority.116  
State actions, the pending reform legislation, and EPA’s current 
TSCA trajectory are discussed below. 
                                                          
EPA to follow is to consider each regulatory option, beginning with the least 
burdensome, and the costs and benefits of regulation under each option.”). 
 109. Id. at 1229–30.  The court focused on the fact that in choosing the ban, “EPA 
presented two comparisons[:]  . . . a world with no further regulation under TSCA, 
and a world in which no manufacture of asbestos takes place.  The EPA rejected 
calculating how many lives a less burdensome regulation would save, and at what 
cost.”  Id. at 1216.  The court held that EPA’s failure to show “that the actions 
Congress identified [in section 6] as less burdensome also would not do the job” 
amounted to a “failure to meet its burden of showing that its actions . . . reduce the 
risk . . . in the Congressionally-mandated least burdensome fashion.”  Id. at 1217. 
 110. TSCA does not define the term “unreasonable risk.”  Therefore, in Corrosion 
Proof Fittings the court analogized to other statutes where Congress directed agencies 
to act to prevent “unreasonable risks.”  Id. at 1222.  The court reasoned that 
“unreasonable risk” “necessarily involves a balancing test” whereby EPA must analyze 
the costs and benefits of any action taken to prevent such a risk.  Id.   
 111. Id. at 1228. 
 112. See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 75, at 58–60 (describing 
bans of polychlorinated biphenyls, fully halogenated chlorofluoroalkanes, dioxin, 
asbestos, and hexavalent chromium, all of which EPA imposed before the Fifth 
Circuit’s decision in Corrosion Proof Fittings). 
 113. TSCA §§ 1–30, 15 U.S.C. §§ 2601–29 (2006). 
 114. See infra Part I.C.1. 
 115. See infra Part I.C.2. 
 116. See infra Part I.C.3. 
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1. State responses to stymied federal action 
In 2007, bisphenol A (BPA), a chemical used to make hard plastics 
such as baby bottles and sports bottles, made headlines across the 
country.117  A U.S. government-sponsored panel found that exposure 
through ingesting liquid housed in a plastic container made with BPA 
was linked to neurological and behavioral effects in developing 
fetuses, and required further study to determine the effects on 
adults.118  In addition to the firestorm of media coverage, the 
troubling findings about BPA’s likely toxicity spurred eight states119 to 
ban this chemical as the federal government evaluated its options; 
federal regulation of BPA under TSCA is still pending.120 
State action to regulate toxic chemicals goes beyond the recent 
series of laws passed in response to the risks of BPA.  A November 
2010 report based on a nationwide survey of state toxics regulation 
found that “18 states have passed 71 chemical safety laws in the last 
eight years by an overwhelming, bipartisan margin.”121  The report 
points to three primary factors that have led to both the prevalence 
and success of state laws regulating chemicals:  “growing scientific 
evidence of harm, strong public outcry, and Congress’s failure to act 
[to reform TSCA].”122  States’ ability to pass laws regulating chemicals 
in the face of federal inaction is also due to TSCA’s express 
preemption provision.123 
The Supreme Court has held that the Constitution mandates that 
                                                          
 117. See, e.g., Steven Reinberg, Plastics Chemical of ‘Some Concern’ for Fetal, Child 
Health, WASH. POST, Aug. 9, 2007, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2007/08/08/AR2007080802060.html (reporting that “[a]nimal 
experiments have suggested that BPA may mimic the female sex hormone 
estradiol”); Lisa Stiffler, Are Plastic Bottles Dangerous?, SEATTLE POST-INTELLIGENCER, 
Aug. 8, 2007, http://www.seattlepi.com/local/326907_plastic09.html (noting that 
the same week that the federal study related to risks of BPA was released, another 
study came out which found that BPA risks were negligible).  Since the initial 
attention to BPA in 2007, researchers continue to explore the chemical’s risks, and 
some advocate for a federal ban.  See Elizabeth Kolbert, A Warning by Key Researcher on 
Risks of BPA in Our Lives, YALE ENV’T 360 (Nov. 24, 2010), http://e360.yale.edu/ 
feature/a_warning_by_key_researcher_on_risks_of_bpa_in_our_lives/2344/ 
(likening BPA to a known carcinogen and hormonal disrupting chemical called DES, 
which was administered to women in the 1950s and then banned when it became 
known that DES caused serious reproductive disorders and elevated cancer levels).   
 118. Reinberg, supra note 117.   
 119. See Jane Houlihan et al., Timeline:  BPA from Invention to Phase-Out, ENVTL. 
WORKING GRP., http://www.ewg.org/reports/bpatimeline (last updated Mar. 2011) 
(chronicling state action on BPA).  To date, California, Connecticut, Maryland, 
Massachusetts, Minnesota, New York, Washington, and Wisconsin have issued full or 
partial BPA bans.  Id. 
 120. See infra Part I.C.3.  
 121. BELLIVEAU, supra note 13, at 26. 
 122. Id. at 7. 
 123. TSCA § 18(a), 15 U.S.C. § 2617(a) (2006). 
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“[w]here a state statute conflicts with, or frustrates, federal law, the 
former must give way.”124  However, courts must not declare that a 
state law is preempted unless Congress clearly intended for the 
federal law to be preeminent.125  To determine whether Congress 
intended for a federal act to preempt the states’ powers, courts 
should first look to “the plain wording” of a statute’s express 
preemption clause, which contains the most conclusive evidence of 
Congress’s intent.126  TSCA contains such an express preemption 
provision; thus, this provision is where courts will begin their review 
in deciding whether a state law is preempted by TSCA.127 
TSCA’s preemption provision, located in section 18 of the statute, 
states that “nothing in this chapter shall affect the authority of any 
State or political subdivision of a State to establish or continue in 
effect regulation of any chemical substance.”128  There are two 
exceptions to this provision:  (1) where EPA has issued a section 4 
test rule for a substance, a state’s ability to establish or continue a 
testing requirement for the same substance or mixture is 
preempted;129 and (2) where EPA has issued a rule or order under 
section 5 or section 6, any state requirement applying to the same 
substance must be either identical to or more stringent than the 
federal rule.130  Thus, where EPA has not regulated a chemical, states 
are free to regulate it as they wish.131  Where EPA has regulated a 
chemical under section 5 or section 6, states can do so as well—so 
long as the states’ requirements are at least as protective as the 
federal requirement.132 
2. Brief overview of House and Senate reform bills 
In April 2010, following the rising tide of state legislation,133 
coupled with intense pressure from environmental and health 
                                                          
 124. CSX Transp., Inc. v. Easterwood, 507 U.S. 658, 663 (1993). 
 125. Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947). 
 126. CSX Transp., 507 U.S. at 664. 
 127. See id. (explaining a court’s task in making a preemption determination when 
dealing with a statute containing an express preemption clause). 
 128. TSCA § 18(a)(1). 
 129. Id. § 18(a)(2)(A). 
 130. See id. § 18(a)(2)(B) (providing that where EPA has regulated a chemical 
under section 5 or section 6, a state regulation that differs from the federal rule will 
avoid preemption so long as it bans that chemical). 
 131. Id. § 18(a). 
 132. States can either regulate to the same extent that the federal government has 
or go a step further and ban the substance entirely.  Id. § 18(a)(2)(B). 
 133. See BELLIVEAU, supra note 13, at 12 (detailing how the rate of policymaking 
has tripled since 2003, such that by 2010, state legislatures passed fourteen state toxic 
chemical laws per year compared with four laws per year in 2003). 
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advocacy groups,134 Senator Frank R. Lautenberg introduced 
legislation to reform TSCA in the Senate.135  In July 2010, 
Representatives Henry A. Waxman and Bobby Rush introduced their 
own version of such legislation in the House.136  In April 2011, 
Senator Lautenberg reintroduced his legislation.137  The current bills, 
entitled the “Safe Chemicals Act of 2011” in the Senate and the 
“Toxic Chemicals Safety Act of 2010” in the House, are similar;138 
both attempt to address what have been identified as the “core 
failings” of TSCA.139  
The proposed reform legislation amends the core provisions of 
TSCA to give EPA greater flexibility and authority to regulate 
chemical risks.140  The reform bills would change section 4 of TSCA to 
require that manufacturers and processors send a “minimum data 
set” to EPA without EPA having to require them to do so by rule.141  
                                                          
 134. See, e.g., Molly Gray, When It Comes to Chemicals, “Safe Until Proven Harmful” Isn’t 
Good Enough for My Baby and Me, SAFER CHEMICALS, HEALTHY FAMILIES BLOG (Feb. 4, 
2010), http://blog.saferchemicals.org/2010/02/when-it-comes-to-chemicals-safe-
until-proven-harmful-isnt-good-enough-for-my-baby-and-me.html (describing how 
test results in a study of nine pregnant women showed the author had chemical 
exposure above the national average despite doing “everything [she] could to reduce 
[her] exposure to toxic chemicals”); Linda Greer, Part I:  Stemming the Tide of Toxic 
Chemicals, SWITCHBOARD (Mar. 2, 2009), http://switchboard.nrdc.org/blogs/ 
lgreer/part_i_stemming_the_tide_of_to.html (arguing that “President Obama and 
his new, more progressive government will not be able to fix the mess [caused by 
toxic chemicals]” because “many problems in current policy have their origins in the 
fundamental weakness of the main federal law intended to comprehensively regulate 
the use of toxic chemicals”). 
 135. Safe Chemicals Act of 2010, S. 3209, 111th Cong. 
 136. Toxic Chemicals Safety Act of 2010, H.R. 5820, 111th Cong. 
 137. Safe Chemicals Act of 2011, S. 847, 112th Cong. 
 138. See Summary and Comparison of the TSCA Reform Legislation, BERGESON & 
CAMPBELL, P.C. (Apr. 27, 2010), http://www.lawbc.com/regulatory-developments/ 
entry/summary-and-comparison-of-the-tsca-reform-legislation/ (summarizing the 
Discussion Draft of the House bill and noting the differences between the House and 
Senate bill, of which there are few).  Though this comparison addressed the original 
2010 Senate bill, the portions of the 2011 bill addressed in this Comment have not 
changed significantly since the 2010 version.   
 139. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Press Release, Senator Frank 
R. Lautenberg, Sen. Lautenberg Introduces “Safe Chemicals Act of 2011” (Apr. 14, 
2011), http://lautenberg.senate.gov/newsroom/record.cfm?id=332785& (“[The] 
‘Safe Chemicals Act of 2011’ would require safety testing of all industrial chemicals, 
and puts the burden on industry to prove that chemicals are safe in order stay on the 
market.  Under current policy, the [EPA] can only call for safety testing after 
evidence surfaces demonstrating a chemical is dangerous.”). 
 140. Press Release, Senator Frank R. Lautenberg, supra note 139. 
 141. See S. 847 § 4(a)(2) (requiring manufacturers to submit data to EPA for both 
new and existing chemicals); H.R. 5820 § 4(a)(2) (also requiring manufacturers to 
submit data for both new and existing chemicals).  Further, the proposed section 4 
would also give EPA the authority to require testing beyond the “minimum data set” 
via orders, thus circumventing the extensive requirements that come with 
rulemaking.  S. 847 § 4(b)(1)(A) (allowing EPA to require testing “by rule or order” 
(emphasis added)); H.R. 5820 § 4(b) (entitled “Testing Rules and Orders”). 
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The bills would also change section 5 of TSCA to further shift the 
burden of proof from EPA to manufacturers:  rather than approving 
chemicals absent EPA action, both new and existing chemicals could 
not be manufactured unless EPA determines that such chemicals 
meet safety standards set by the Agency.142  Under section 6, the new 
legislation affords EPA significantly more leeway to regulate 
dangerous chemicals; specifically, EPA would no longer have to 
choose the “least burdensome requirements” when regulating.143  
Lastly, judicial review under the reform bills would be subject to the 
APA “arbitrary and capricious” standard of review, rather than the 
“substantial evidence” standard.144  In short, both bills attempt to 
remove the procedural and legal obstacles that have plagued TSCA. 
3. The Obama EPA’s aggressive new approach to its TSCA authority 
Current EPA officials have been among the most vocal proponents 
of TSCA reform.145  However, in addition to pushing Congress to pass 
a new law, the current EPA has also pledged to aggressively use the 
TSCA authority that it currently possesses.146  In September 2009, EPA 
unveiled its plans to regulate what it considers to be some of the 
greatest chemical threats that are currently unregulated under TSCA 
in a series of “Chemical Action Plans.”147  These plans have been 
described as “almost breathtaking in scope” and are unprecedented 
in the history of EPA’s implementation of TSCA.148  Part II argues that 
                                                          
 142. S. 847 § 6(b)(1)(B)(i), (b)(3)(B); H.R. 5820 § 6(b)(2). 
 143. Compare S. 847 § 6(c) (authorizing EPA to manage risks of toxic chemicals 
through options such as outright bans or warning label requirements, without 
imposing a “least burdensome alternative” requirement), and H.R. 5820 § 6(c) 
(same), with TSCA § 6(a), 15 U.S.C. § 2605(a) (2006) (requiring that EPA protect 
against chemical risk using the “least burdensome requirements”).   
 144. See S. 847 § 19 (noting that relief should be granted in accordance with 
“chapter 7 of title 5, United States Code,” i.e. the APA, located at 5 U.S.C. § 706); 
H.R. 5820 § 19 (also requiring that judicial review follow the provisions of the APA). 
 145. See Current Science on Public Exposures to Toxic Chemicals Before the Subcomm. on 
Superfund, Toxics, and Envtl. Health of the S. Comm. on Env’t and Pub. Works, 111th 
Cong. 2 (2010), available at http://epw.senate.gov/public/index.cfm?FuseAction= 
Files.View&FileStore_id=1ce6689c-cf2c-4ced-a4f0-524283f4add8 (statement of Steve 
Owens, Assistant Administrator, Office of Prevention, Pesticides, and Toxic 
Substances, U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency) (testifying that “EPA’s authority is outdated and 
does not provide the tools to adequately protect human health and the 
environment”); see also TSCA Hearings, supra note 9, at 5 (statement of Steve Owens, 
Assistant Administrator, Office of Chem. Safety and Pollution Prevention, U.S. Envtl. 
Prot. Agency) (observing that the House Toxic Chemicals Safety Act, “if enacted, 
would substantially update and modernize TSCA”).   
 146. Enhancing EPA’s Chemical Management Program, supra note 13. 
 147. Id. (noting that “EPA is developing chemical action plans which will target the 
Agency’s risk management efforts on chemicals of concern” (emphasis added)). 
 148. See Charles Auer et al., EPA’s Action Plans Signal a New Chapter for TSCA While 
Informing the Future Legislative Debate on Chemicals, 40 ENVTL. L. REP. 10,243, 10,243 
(2010) (noting that “EPA has never previously announced so many actions under 
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a number of the actions proposed by EPA have potential to both 
effectuate TSCA’s goals and to withstand court challenges.  These 
actions include EPA’s authority (1) to require chemical testing under 
section 4(a)(1)(B); (2) to create a list of chemicals that pose a 
potential threat to health and the environment pursuant to section 
5(b)(4)(A); and (3) to regulate dangerous chemicals under section 
6.149 
These actions are in various stages of implementation.  Pursuant to 
its section 4(a)(1)(B) authority, on January 7, 2011, EPA issued a 
final rule requiring the manufacturers of nineteen chemicals that the 
Agency found were produced in “substantial quantities” and resulted 
in “substantial human exposure,” and for which little to no data is 
currently available, to test the chemicals’ effects on health and the 
environment.150  In contrast, EPA has not yet issued its Chemicals of 
Concern list—which it has authority to issue pursuant to section 
5(b)(4)(A)—as a final rule since it initially proposed the rule in April 
2010.151  Lastly, EPA has yet to take any final action using its section 6 
authority; however, as is explained in Part II.C, EPA should not be 
dissuaded from using this authority by current precedent.152 
II. WAYS IN WHICH EPA CAN MAKE (AND IS MAKING) THE MOST OF 
ITS AUTHORITY UNDER TSCA TO PROTECT PUBLIC HEALTH AND THE 
ENVIRONMENT 
Despite its procedural and substantive hurdles, TSCA still presents 
opportunities for EPA to act now to minimize chemical risks.  EPA 
has identified several areas of the statute that offer regulatory 
                                                          
[TSCA], nor has it ever cited use of § 6 so widely”).   
 149. Infra Part II. 
 150. See Testing of Certain High Production Volume Chemicals; Second Group of 
Chemicals, 76 Fed. Reg. 1067, 1069 (Jan. 7, 2011) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 9, 
799). 
 151. See RegInfo.gov, OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, http://www.reginfo.gov/public/ 
do/eAgendaViewRule?pubId=201010&RIN=2070-AJ70 (last visited Oct. 2, 2011) 
(“EPA is proposing to add a category of eight phthalates, a category of 
polybrominated diphenyl ethers (PBDEs), and bisphenol A (BPA) to a list of 
chemical substances that EPA finds present an unreasonable risk of injury to human 
health or the environment.”). 
 152. This Comment acknowledges that it is likely, based on the terms of TSCA’s 
judicial review provision, that any EPA rule banning a chemical substance would be 
reviewed by the Fifth Circuit, for which Corrosion Proof Fittings is binding authority.  
See TSCA § 19(a)(1)(A), 15 U.S.C. § 2618(a)(1)(A) (2006) (allowing parties to file a 
petition for review in the Court of Appeals with jurisdiction over the area “in which 
such person’s principal place of business is located”).  Notably, many chemical 
manufacturers operate facilities in the states that make up the Fifth Circuit.  In Part 
II.C, this Comment lays out an argument for why the Fifth Circuit’s decision in 
Corrosion Proof Fittings was erroneous and thus argues that any reviewing court should 
not rely on that decision (and in the case of the Fifth Circuit, should overturn it). 
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potential in its proposed Chemical Action Plans.153  These 
opportunities are present in areas of the statute where courts have 
afforded EPA relative leeway in using its authority.154  They are also 
present in provisions of TSCA that EPA has never used before, but 
are well within its authority.155  Lastly, they are present in areas of the 
law that are long overdue for reexamination; specifically, it is time for 
a reinterpretation of EPA’s authority under section 6.156 
Actions in each of these areas present an avenue for EPA to realize 
some of the promise that remains in the current law.  Further, all of 
the foregoing actions are within the Agency’s legal authority under 
TSCA and, when carried out in accordance with the statute, should 
be able to withstand likely court challenges and help effectuate 
TSCA’s purpose of protecting human health and the environment 
from chemical risks.  While TSCA certainly presents some 
opportunities beyond the scope of this Comment, the following 
methods of regulation each represent a significant step toward 
making TSCA work now. 
A. EPA Can Take Advantage of Relatively Broad Judicial Interpretations of 
Its Section 4 Authority to Fill in Information Gaps Regarding Chemical Risk 
According to commentators, one of TSCA’s greatest failures is that 
it has not produced the comprehensive chemical health and safety 
data that Congress envisioned when it passed the statute.157  Largely 
because the statute does not create an affirmative duty for 
manufacturers to test chemicals—rather, manufacturers are only 
legally required to perform tests when EPA issues a test rule—
“troubling gaps” are present in EPA’s current universe of data on 
chemical risks.158  However, section 4(a)(1)(B) of TSCA presents an 
opportunity for EPA to issue rules that will generate health and safety 
information about some of the most prevalent chemicals on the 
market, for which data is currently lacking.  As a result of EPA’s 
recently issued section 4(a)(1)(B) rule,159 manufacturers of nineteen 
                                                          
 153. See Existing Chemicals Action Plans, supra note 147 (describing how EPA is 
deciding what chemicals to select for action plans based on factors like “[h]igh 
production,” “consumer products,” and “[c]hemicals subject to review and potential 
action in international forums”). 
 154. Infra Part II.A. 
 155. Infra Part II.B. 
 156. See infra Part II.C (discussing the only judicial interpretation of EPA’s section 
6 authority to date). 
 157. See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 75, at 19 (noting that EPA 
has made “little progress” in reviewing chemical risks since it first began chemical 
review in 1979). 
 158. Jackson, supra note 78.  
 159. Testing of Certain High Production Volume Chemicals; Second Group of 
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highly prevalent chemicals will be required for the first time to 
perform tests to determine the chemicals’ overall toxicity, including 
“[d]evelopmental and reproductive toxicity” and “[g]enetic 
toxicity.”160  EPA can then use this data, and data generated from 
similar future rules, to make fully informed decisions about how to 
handle any risks posed by these prevalent chemicals.161  For the 
following reasons, if EPA’s recently issued rule or similar future rules 
are challenged, a court will likely uphold such rules as valid exercises 
of EPA authority. 
In accordance with the Supreme Court’s holding in Chevron, a 
court will likely defer to EPA’s construction of the requirements for 
issuing a section 4(a)(1)(B) rule.162  To issue a rule under this section, 
the statute requires that EPA determine (1) that the chemicals being 
regulated enter the environment in “substantial quantities,” or are 
produced in “substantial quantities” and result in “substantial human 
exposure,” and (2) whether testing is necessary to fill in gaps in 
knowledge about the effects of the tested chemical.163  However, 
neither TSCA nor its legislative history defines what quantities of 
chemical or what level of human or environmental exposure suffice 
to be considered “substantial.”164  Because Congress left these terms 
undefined in the statute, the Supreme Court’s analysis in Chevron is 
applicable here.165 
In Chevron, the Court held that where a statute is silent or 
ambiguous as to a particular term in a statute delegating authority to 
an agency to make rules carrying the force of law, an agency has 
                                                          
Chemicals, 76 Fed. Reg. 1067, 1067 (Jan. 7, 2011) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 9, 
799). 
 160. Id. at 1069.  
 161. If, based on the data that EPA receives as a result of testing mandated by 
section 4(a)(1)(B) rules, EPA finds that a chemical “presents or will present an 
unreasonable risk of injury to health or the environment,” TSCA § 6(a), 15 U.S.C. § 
2605 (2006), it can then regulate that chemical pursuant to section 6 of TSCA.  Id.  
To date, EPA has proposed an additional rule that would require manufacturers of 
another set of high production volume chemicals to submit test data to the Agency.  
Testing of Certain High Production Volume Chemicals; Third Group of Chemicals, 
75 Fed. Reg. 8575, 8575 (Feb. 25, 2010) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 799). 
 162. See Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 844 
(1984) (“We have long recognized that considerable weight should be accorded to 
an executive department’s construction of a statutory scheme it is entrusted to 
administer.”). 
 163. TSCA § 4(a)(1)(B). 
 164. See id. § 3 (lacking “substantial” in “Definitions” section); Chem. Mfrs. Ass’n v. 
EPA, 899 F.2d 344, 353 (5th Cir. 1990) (noting that “TSCA contains no definition of 
‘substantial,’ nor does its legislative history”). 
 165. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843 (asserting that “if the statute is silent or ambiguous 
with respect to the specific issue, the question for the court is whether the agency’s 
answer is based on a permissible construction of the statute”). 
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implicit authority to define that term, and any reasonable 
interpretation by the agency should be upheld.166  Further, the Court 
also held that where Congress “left a gap” for the agency to fill, 
Congress explicitly delegated to the agency the authority to define a 
statutory term.167  In section 4(a)(1)(B), Congress seemingly left such 
a gap for EPA to fill by requiring EPA to issue a test rule if it 
determines that a chemical is produced in “substantial quantities” 
and enters the environment in “substantial quantities,” without 
defining what a “substantial quantity” is.168  Thus, under Chevron, a 
court should uphold EPA’s interpretation of these terms unless it is 
based on an impermissible or unreasonable construction of the 
statute.169 
Accordingly, in Chemical Manufacturers, the Fifth Circuit held that 
by failing to define what amount of chemical constitutes a 
“substantial quantity” and what level of human exposure is 
“substantial” for purposes of triggering section 4(a)(1)(B), Congress 
gave EPA “considerable latitude” to define these terms.170  Though 
the court did not cite to Chevron in that decision, the court’s holding 
reflected the deference required by the Supreme Court in Chevron 
and its progeny.171  Thus, in accordance with both the Supreme 
Court’s holding in Chevron and the Fifth Circuit’s holding in Chemical 
Manufacturers,172 the interpretation of “substantial quantity” and 
“substantial human exposure” espoused by EPA in its 1993 guidance 
document,173 as incorporated by reference in EPA’s recently issued 
section 4(a)(1)(B) test rules,174 should be the standard to which a 
                                                          
 166. Id. at 843–44. 
 167. Id.  
 168. TSCA § 4(a)(1)(B). 
 169. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843. 
 170. Chem. Mfrs. Ass’n v. EPA, 899 F.2d 344, 359 (5th Cir. 1990) (citation 
omitted).  
 171. Compare Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842–43 (requiring that courts first ask whether 
Congress has directly addressed the issue, and if not, whether the agency permissibly 
interpreted the statute), with Chem. Mfrs., 899 F.2d at 354 (observing that Congress 
did not define the term in the statute, and that the court would uphold EPA’s 
interpretation as long as it was consistent with the statutory scheme).  
 172. Chem. Mfrs., 899 F.2d at 354. 
 173. See TSCA Section 4(a)(1)(B) Final Statement of Policy; Criteria for 
Evaluating Substantial Production, Substantial Release, and Substantial or Significant 
Human Exposure, 58 Fed. Reg. 28,736, 28,736 (May 14, 1993) (stating that the 
purpose of the 1993 guidance document is to establish “threshold amounts to make 
‘substantial’ production, release, and human exposure findings under TSCA section 
4(a)(1)(B)”).  
 174. In its section 4(a)(1)(B) test rule, EPA sets out its interpretation of the 
meaning of “substantial quantity” and “substantial human exposure” by 
incorporating the interpretation espoused by the Agency in its 1993 guidance 
document.  See Testing of Certain High Production Volume Chemicals; Second 
Group of Chemicals, 76 Fed. Reg. 1067, 1072 (Jan. 7, 2011) (to be codified at 40 
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court looks in determining whether these two threshold 
requirements for a new test rule have been met.175 
In TSCA’s legislative history, Congress was “permissive and 
expansive” in defining EPA’s discretion to interpret these terms, 
further supporting EPA’s broad grant of authority to define what is 
required to satisfy the section 4(a)(1)(B) test rule requirements.176  
Chevron demands only that an agency’s interpretation be a reasonable 
or “permissible construction” of the statute that the agency is charged 
with administering.177  As EPA based its interpretation of the terms 
“substantial quantity” and “substantial human exposure” on its 
expertise and knowledge of chemical risks,178 courts will likely uphold 
its interpretation as a valid interpretation of section 4(a)(1)(B). 
EPA determined in both its guidance document and its recent rule 
that TSCA contemplates a “substantial quantity” as being more than 
one million pounds per year;179 production of each of the chemicals 
                                                          
C.F.R. pts. 9, 799) (restating the definition of “substantial quantities” used in EPA’s 
1993 guidance document and noting that “EPA believes that in general an 
environmental release of a chemical substance in an amount equal to or greater than 
1 million lbs per year or greater than 10% of the reported production volume is 
‘substantial’ as that term is used with reference to ‘enter the environment in 
substantial quantities’ in TSCA section 4(a)(1)(B)(i)”); see also TSCA Section 
4(a)(1)(B) Final Statement of Policy; Criteria for Evaluating Substantial Production, 
Substantial Release, and Substantial or Significant Human Exposure, 58 Fed. Reg. at 
28,736.  Thus, while the Supreme Court held in Mead that agency guidance 
documents are not entitled to the same level of deference as agency rules intended 
to carry the force of law, the Court’s analysis in Mead is inapplicable here as EPA set 
out its interpretation of these terms in its guidance document within its rulemaking.  
See United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 229–30 (2001) (observing that while 
Chevron deference does not apply to agency pronouncements that do not carry the 
force of law, such as guidance documents, “a very good indicat[ion] of delegation 
meriting Chevron treatment i[s] express congressional authorizations to engage in 
the process of rulemaking or adjudication that produces regulations or rulings for 
which deference is claimed”).  Thus, here, EPA is entitled to Chevron deference, and 
not the lower level of deference revived by the Court in Mead, as EPA’s interpretation 
is in an area of the statute where Congress delegated to EPA the authority to make 
binding regulations.  See id. 
 175. Chem. Mfrs., 899 F.2d at 359.  
 176. Id. at 355 n.15, 356 n.16 (citing H.R. REP. NO. 94-1341, at 18 (1976), reprinted 
in H. COMM. ON INTERSTATE AND FOREIGN COMMERCE, 94TH CONG., LEGISLATIVE 
HISTORY OF THE TOXIC SUBSTANCES CONTROL ACT, at 425 (Comm. Print 1976)). 
 177. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843 
(1984). 
 178. TSCA Section 4(a)(1)(B) Final Statement of Policy; Criteria for Evaluating 
Substantial Production, Substantial Release, and Substantial or Significant Human 
Exposure, 58 Fed. Reg. at 28,736.  Further, CMA acknowledged in its comments that 
EPA’s determination that production of one million pounds of a chemical was a 
“substantial quantity” was reasonable.  Id. at 28,739.  
 179. Id.; see also Testing of Certain High Production Volume Chemicals; Second 
Group of Chemicals, 76 Fed. Reg. 1067, 1071–72 (Jan. 7, 2011) (to be codified at 40 
C.F.R. pts. 9, 799) (restating the definition of “substantial quantities” used in EPA’s 
1993 guidance document and commenting that “EPA believes that in general an 
environmental release of a chemical substance in an amount equal to or greater than 
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regulated in EPA’s rule exceeds this amount.180  In addition, EPA 
found that all nineteen chemicals met the requisite level of exposure 
to be considered “substantial” in the employment context, which is 
exposure of over 1000 workers to a chemical substance.181  Based on 
EPA’s discretion to define these terms in its rulemaking, a court will 
likely determine that EPA has met the first two requirements to 
trigger its section 4(a)(1)(B) authority.  
However, to withstand judicial review, EPA must also show that its 
determinations are supported by substantial evidence in the record.182  
In the test rule, EPA included extensive information to support its 
findings that the chemicals subject to the rule are produced in 
“substantial quantities” and result in “substantial human exposure.”183  
Namely, EPA noted that its estimates of the quantity of chemicals 
produced, as well as the exposure of workers to the chemicals, are 
based on information that manufacturers submitted to EPA pursuant 
to section 8(a) of TSCA,184 which requires manufacturers to report 
current data on the volume of chemicals they produce to EPA every 
four years.185 
In Chemical Manufacturers, the Fifth Circuit held that where EPA 
had scientific studies to support its finding that three million pounds 
of cumene entered the atmosphere, and where CMA failed to show 
that such findings were “fatally flawed,”186 EPA’s determination was a 
“reasonable ball-park estimate” supported by substantial evidence in 
the record.187  Here, unlike in Chemical Manufacturers where EPA’s 
studies were in conflict with CMA’s,188 EPA based its estimates of the 
quantities of chemicals produced and released on the manufacturers’ 
own data.189  Thus, in its January 2011 rule, EPA’s determination of 
                                                          
1 million lbs per year or greater than 10% of the reported production volume is 
‘substantial’ as that term is used with reference to ‘enter the environment in 
substantial quantities’ in TSCA section 4(a)(1)(B)(i)”). 
 180. Testing of Certain High Production Volume Chemicals; Second Group of 
Chemicals, 76 Fed. Reg. at 1070. 
 181. Id. 
 182. TSCA § 19(c), 15 U.S.C. § 2618(c) (2006). 
 183. Testing of Certain High Production Volume Chemicals; Second Group of 
Chemicals, 76 Fed. Reg. at 1069–71. 
 184. See id. at 1071–72 (noting that production and worker exposure data “is 
based, in large part, on information submitted in accordance with the 2006 [section 
8(a) Inventory Update Rule]”). 
 185. This requirement is known as the Inventory Update Rule (IUR).  See TSCA § 
8(a); 40 C.F.R. §§ 710.25, 33 (2010). 
 186. Chem. Mfrs. Ass’n v. EPA, 899 F.2d 344, 352 (5th Cir. 1990). 
 187. Id. at 353. 
 188. Id. at 352 (recognizing that “EPA identified sufficient defects in the CMA 
study to justify a determination not to rely on it”).  
 189. Testing of Certain High Production Volume Chemicals; Second Group of 
Chemicals, 76 Fed. Reg. at 1071 (noting that EPA’s finding regarding the production 
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the amount of chemicals produced should logically be the same as 
the manufacturers’, as EPA based its production estimates on data 
submitted by the manufacturers themselves.190  It follows that EPA’s 
estimates of the “substantial quantities” of chemicals produced are 
even closer to the mark than a “reasonable ball-park estimate”191—
they are manufacturers’ actual production figures. 
Similarly, EPA’s estimate of the “substantial human exposure” 
resulting from the use of these nineteen chemicals is also based in 
large part on data sent to EPA by the manufacturers themselves.192  
However, unlike production information (for which manufacturers 
are the seemingly most authoritative source), the worker exposure 
data that the manufacturers sent to EPA was submitted only “to the 
extent the information was readily obtainable.”193  While in the Fifth 
Circuit Chemical Manufacturers case CMA attempted to debunk EPA’s 
estimate of the amount of cumene released with CMA’s own 
drastically lower estimate,194 to the extent that the manufacturers 
submitted worker exposure data to EPA, EPA’s estimates and the 
manufacturers’ estimates will largely match up and therefore should 
not be challenged. 
However, for chemicals for which manufacturers did not submit 
worker exposure data,195 EPA also based its exposure estimates on 
National Occupational Exposure Survey (NOES) data developed by 
the National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health, and EPA 
analyzed this data in its rule.196  In Chemical Manufacturers, the Fifth 
Circuit noted that EPA is not required to determine exact quantities 
in estimating the human exposure or environmental release of a 
chemical, but rather that a “reasonable ball-park estimate” is 
acceptable, and “rough approximation suffices.”197  Here, where 
EPA’s estimate that at least 1000 workers are exposed to each of the 
nineteen chemicals is based on data from the chemical 
manufacturers as well as the NOES data and the Agency’s own 
                                                          
of the nineteen chemicals subject to the rule was “based on information gathered 
pursuant to the 2006 IUR,” which requires manufacturers to submit production data 
to EPA). 
 190. Id. 
 191. Chem. Mfrs., 899 F.2d at 353. 
 192. Testing of Certain High Production Volume Chemicals; Second Group of 
Chemicals, 76 Fed. Reg. at 1071. 
 193. Id. 
 194. Chem. Mfrs., 899 F.2d at 349–50. 
 195. It is not clear from the rule for which chemicals this is true.  See Testing of 
Certain High Production Volume Chemicals; Second Group of Chemicals, 76 Fed. 
Reg. at 1071. 
 196. Id. 
 197. Chem. Mfrs., 899 F.2d at 352–53. 
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analysis, a court will likely find that EPA has supported its estimate 
with substantial evidence in the record. 
In short, in its recently issued rule EPA has shown—using 
substantial evidence—that the nineteen chemicals subject to the rule 
are produced in “substantial quantities” and result in “substantial 
human exposure.”198  EPA has also substantiated the fact that the last 
two of the four triggers for its use of section 4(a)(1)(B) have been 
met:  (1) there is currently insufficient data for these chemicals; and 
(2) testing is necessary to develop that data.199  EPA determined, 
based on “searches for data” and the “review of studies/data 
identified by commenters [to the rule],” that the data the Agency is 
looking for is unavailable.200 
In Chemical Manufacturers, the CMA did not challenge, and 
therefore the Fifth Circuit did not analyze, EPA’s finding with regard 
to these last two requirements of section 4(a)(1)(B).201  However, 
where, as here, EPA has substantiated its determination that the data 
the Agency is seeking is currently nonexistent, a court will likely 
uphold the Agency’s findings based on the deference shown to EPA 
in Chemical Manufacturers with regard to the first two triggers of 
section 4(a)(1)(B).  Where the Fifth Circuit in Chemical Manufacturers 
found that “rough approximation” sufficed with regard to EPA’s 
estimates for the quantity of chemicals produced and the level of 
exposure,202 a court is likely to find that EPA’s searching attempt to 
find the requested data and subsequent determination that it “knows 
of no other means to generate [this data] other than the testing,”203 
amounts to substantial evidence that testing is necessary.  
Accordingly, a court is likely to uphold EPA’s recently issued rule as a 
valid exercise of the Agency’s section 4(a)(1)(B) authority.  So long 
as EPA similarly substantiates its findings in future rules with regard 
to the four requirements of this section, these rules will likely be 
upheld as well. 
Section 4(a)(1)(B) provides EPA with an opportunity to issue rules 
to fill in gaps concerning the effects of some of the most prevalent 
chemicals in society.  By issuing its recent rule to obtain missing 
information about nineteen chemicals produced in quantities of over 
                                                          
 198. Testing of Certain High Production Volume Chemicals; Second Group of 
Chemicals, 76 Fed. Reg. at 1071–72. 
 199. Id. at 1072–73.  
 200. Id. 
 201. Chem. Mfrs., 899 F.2d at 352 n.12. 
 202. Id. at 352–53. 
 203. Testing of Certain High Production Volume Chemicals; Second Group of 
Chemicals, 76 Fed. Reg. at 1073. 
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one million pounds per year,204 and by issuing similar additional rules, 
EPA can gather currently unknown information about the health and 
safety risks of chemicals produced on a massive scale.  The health and 
safety information that EPA gains from issuing section 4(a)(1)(B) test 
rules can serve as a step toward reducing the risks from these highly 
prevalent chemicals preemptively, before their risks place the public 
or environment’s health in jeopardy.  
B. Section 5 Presents New Opportunities to Raise Public Awareness About 
Chemical Risks 
Another frequent criticism of TSCA is that the statute fails to give 
EPA sufficient guidance on the prioritization of chemicals that 
require regulatory action.205  EPA has proposed using section 
5(b)(4)(A) of TSCA to create a Chemicals of Concern list,206 which 
would help draw attention to particularly dangerous chemicals, as 
well as identify chemicals that are priorities for potential regulation.207  
As section 5(b)(4)(A) is an area of the statute where courts are likely 
to show EPA significant deference, this section presents an 
opportunity for EPA to draw attention to the risk factors of a wide 
range of chemicals. 
To date, EPA has never used section 5(b)(4)(A) of TSCA,208 and 
thus no current court precedent exists interpreting this section’s 
primary requirement:  that EPA may add chemicals to such a list so 
long as it finds that they present an “unreasonable risk” of injury to 
human health or the environment.209  Though “unreasonable risk” is 
not defined in the statute,210 courts have interpreted this term in the 
context of section 4(a)(1)(A) of TSCA and have shown substantial 
                                                          
 204. Id. at 1072–73.  
 205. See Mark A. Greenwood, TSCA Reform:  Building a Program That Can Work, 39 
ENVTL. L. REP. 10,034, 10,036 (2009) (recognizing that “[i]t is unrealistic to expect a 
new TSCA program to review all chemicals under the statute’s jurisdiction”). 
 206. See TSCA Section 5(b)(4) Concern List, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, 
http://www.epa.gov/oppt/existingchemicals/pubs/sect5b4.html (last updated Apr. 
28, 2010) (providing that EPA will compile and maintain the list through 
“rulemaking proceedings with opportunity for notice and comment”).  
 207. See Press Release, U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, EPA Announces Actions to 
Address Chemicals of Concern, Including Phthalates:  Agency Continues Efforts to 
Work for Comprehensive Reform of Toxic Substance Laws (Dec. 30, 2009), 
http://yosemite.epa.gov/opa/admpress.nsf/0/2852C60DC0F65C688525769C0068B
219 (recognizing that 60,000 chemicals were listed in the EPA inventory when TSCA 
was passed in 1976, and since then over 20,000 new chemicals have been created).  
 208. See Auer et al., supra note 148, at 10,244 (observing that while “the George W. 
Bush Administration raised the possibility of using the § 5(b)(4) listing,” the 
“[chemical] industry raised a number of ‘black list’ concerns in its comments”). 
 209. TSCA § 5(b)(4)(A)(i), 15 U.S.C. § 2604(b)(4)(A)(i) (2006). 
 210. Id. § 3.  
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deference to EPA in the process.  As explained in the following 
analysis, it is likely that a court will show similar deference to EPA in 
evaluating its determination of “unreasonable risk” for purposes of 
adding a chemical to a section 5(b)(4)(A) Chemicals of Concern list. 
Principles of statutory interpretation, as espoused by the Supreme 
Court, dictate that courts generally presume that a word or term 
usually carries the same meaning when it occurs more than once in a 
single statute.211  Both section 5(b)(4)(A) and section 4(a)(1)(A) 
contain identical language that permits EPA to issue a rule—either 
listing a chemical in the 5(b)(4)(A) context or requiring a 
manufacturer to test a chemical in the section 4(a)(1)(A) context—
only when EPA determines that a chemical presents an 
“unreasonable risk” of injury to human health or the environment.212  
However, the presumption that identical terms will be given identical 
meanings “yields whenever there is such variation in the connection 
in which the words are used . . . to warrant the conclusion that they 
were employed in different parts of the act with different intent.”213 
TSCA’s legislative history is evidence that Congress intended for 
EPA to apply the term “unreasonable risk” in section 4(a)(1)(A) and 
section 5(b)(4)(A) in the same manner.214  The House Report on the 
bill noted that while “unreasonable risk” is used throughout the 
statute as the standard for defining the regulatory authority of the 
Administrator, the implementation of the standard will necessarily 
“vary depending on the specific regulatory authority which the 
                                                          
 211. See Entvl. Def. v. Duke Energy Corp., 549 U.S. 561, 574 (2007) (“[W]e 
presume that the same term has the same meaning when it occurs here and there in 
a single statute . . . .”).  However, the Court notes later in its opinion that this 
presumption is not irrefutable and can be overcome by evidence of Congressional 
intent to the contrary.  Id. at 574. 
 212. Compare TSCA § 5(b)(4)(A)(i) (“The Administrator may, by rule, compile 
and keep current a list of chemical substances with respect to which the 
Administrator finds that the manufacture, processing, distribution in commerce, use, 
or disposal, or any combination of such activities, presents or may present an 
unreasonable risk of injury to health or the environment.” (emphasis added)), with id. § 
4(a) (“If the Administrator finds that . . . the manufacture, distribution in commerce, 
processing, use, or disposal of a chemical substance or mixture, or that any 
combination of such activities, may present an unreasonable risk of injury to health or the 
environment . . . [along with additional requirements] the Administrator shall by rule 
require that testing be conducted . . . .” (emphasis added)). 
 213. Envtl. Def., 549 U.S. at 574 (quoting Atl. Cleaners & Dyers, Inc. v. United 
States, 286 U.S. 427, 433 (1932)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 214. See H.R. REP. NO. 94-1341, at 13–14 (1976), reprinted in H. COMM. ON 
INTERSTATE AND FOREIGN COMMERCE, 94TH CONG., LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE TOXIC 
SUBSTANCES CONTROL ACT, at 421–22 (Comm. Print 1976) (“[T]he determination of 
unreasonable risk involves a consideration of probability, severity, and similar factors 
which cannot be defined in precise terms and is not a factual determination but 
rather requires the exercise of judgment on the part of the person making it . . . .”). 
TREVISAN.OFF.TO.PRINTER (DO NOT DELETE) 3/26/2012 8:12 PM 
416 AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 61:385 
Administrator seeks to exercise.”215  The committee indicated that the 
reason for varied implementation was Congress’s intent that the 
determination of “unreasonable risk” involve a “balancing” of the 
probability of harm from a chemical with the harm to society from 
limiting the use of a chemical.216  As is explicitly noted in the 
legislative history, the implementation of section 4 of TSCA will not 
result in the public being deprived of the benefits of a chemical that 
is subject to a test rule, and therefore the determination of 
unreasonable risk should reflect that fact.217 
Though the legislative history does not specifically discuss the 
considerations Congress intended EPA to evaluate when determining 
“unreasonable risk” in the section 5(b)(4)(A) context,218 the 
considerations are analogous to those in the section 4(a)(1)(A) 
context.  Just as subjecting a chemical to a section 4 test rule will not 
deprive the public of the benefits of that chemical, adding a chemical 
to a section 5(b)(4)(A) Chemicals of Concern list will also not 
deprive the public of the benefits of that chemical.  Thus, because 
the effect of the regulation under section 4(a)(1)(A) and section 
5(b)(4)(A) is similar, it follows that the implementation of the term 
“unreasonable risk” should be similar in both contexts.  In sum, here, 
where Congress’s intent with respect to the use of “unreasonable risk” 
in these two sections appears to be the same, the presumption that 
these two terms have the same meaning should not yield.219  
Accordingly, courts should find that the interpretation of 
“unreasonable risk” in the section 5(b)(4)(A) context is analogous to 
the section 4(a)(1)(A) context. 
Further, a court may find that the term “unreasonable risk” could 
be applied even more expansively in the section 5(b)(4)(A) context.  
The probability of harm to the environment addressed by a section 
5(b)(4)(A) rule would be balanced against an even lower level of 
harm to manufacturers from the result of the rule than in the section 
4(a)(1)(A) context; when EPA issues a rule pursuant to section 
5(b)(4)(A), it does so at no direct expense to a chemical 
manufacturer.220  Thus, this type of rule can serve as a mechanism for 
                                                          
 215. Id. at 422.  
 216. Id. at 421–22. 
 217. Id. at 422 (“[A] determination that a risk associated with a chemical 
substance or mixture is unreasonable involves balancing the probability that harm 
will occur . . . against the effect of proposed regulatory action on the availability [of a 
chemical] to society . . . .”). 
 218. Id. at 421–22. 
 219. Envtl. Def. v. Duke Energy Corp., 549 U.S. 561, 574 (2007). 
 220. Unlike a section 4(a)(1)(A) test rule, which requires that manufacturers 
submit extensive testing data, the creation of a section 5(b)(4)(A) Chemicals of 
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EPA to draw attention to chemical risks and provide an indirect 
environmental benefit via potentially changed consumer habits, 
weighed against a relatively low cost to manufacturers.  In contrast, 
testing pursuant to section 4(a)(1)(A) also provides an indirect 
environmental benefit, but this benefit is weighed against a multi-
million dollar burden to manufacturers.221  However, whether 
“unreasonable risk” is interpreted more leniently in the section 
5(b)(4)(A) context or not, it follows that a court will likely be at least 
as deferential to EPA in construing section 5(b)(4)(A) as in 
construing section 4(a)(1)(A). 
In interpreting “unreasonable risk” in cases involving challenges to 
section 4(a)(1)(A) rules, courts have shown EPA significant 
deference both in making its determination as to what constitutes 
“unreasonable risk” and the type of evidence required to support that 
determination.  For example, in Chemical Manufacturers, the D.C. 
Circuit held that to show that a chemical poses an “unreasonable 
risk,” EPA must simply show that the risk caused by the chemical is 
“more probable than not,” and further, that EPA can issue a rule so 
long as it has a “more-than-theoretical basis” for believing that a 
chemical is toxic at a given exposure level.222  Thus, the standard for 
showing “unreasonable risk” affords EPA significant latitude in 
determining the basis for the risk.  
Despite this latitude, in section 4(a)(1)(A) as well as in section 
5(b)(4)(A), EPA must still support its determination with substantial 
evidence.223  However, Ausimont shows that in the section 4(a)(1)(A) 
context, and by analogy in the section 5(b)(4)(A) context, substantial 
evidence review requires that EPA “demonstrate not fact, but doubt 
and uncertainty.”224  Thus, EPA is not required to gather evidence 
that conclusively shows that a chemical poses a high level of risk, but 
rather it must show that there is potential that a chemical poses such a 
risk (i.e. “doubt and uncertainty”).225 
To date, EPA has based its choice of chemicals to be added to a 
Chemicals of Concern list on existing toxicity data and “evidence of 
pervasive human and environmental exposure.”226  For each of the 
                                                          
Concern list does not create a direct expense for chemical manufacturers.  
 221. Id. 
 222. Chem. Mfrs. Ass’n v. EPA, 859 F.2d 977, 984–85 (D.C. Cir. 1988). 
 223. TSCA § 19(c)(1)(B)(i), 15 U.S.C. § 2618(c)(1)(B)(i) (2006) (requiring 
courts to “hold unlawful and set aside” any rule that is “not supported by substantial 
evidence in the rulemaking record”). 
 224. Ausimont U.S.A. Inc. v. EPA, 838 F.2d 93, 96 (3d Cir. 1988). 
 225. Id. 
 226. See, e.g., U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, PHTHALATES ACTION PLAN 1 (2009), 
available at http://www.epa.gov/opptintr/existingchemicals/pubs/actionplans/ 
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chemicals that EPA has proposed adding to the list, EPA already has 
extensive evidence that each chemical poses “an unreasonable risk” 
to human health and the environment.227  In Ausimont, the Third 
Circuit held that so long as EPA has supported its finding of the 
potential for risk, it has met its burden under the substantial evidence 
standard.228  Here, EPA has documentation of the known, as well as 
potential, risks of listed chemicals from existing studies and testing to 
support its finding.229  Therefore, a court will likely find EPA’s 
authority to list such substances under section 5(b)(4)(A) has been 
triggered. 
Lastly, while listing a chemical on a Chemicals of Concern list 
pursuant to section 5(b)(4)(A) does not create a direct expense for 
manufacturers, manufacturers might argue that it costs them in terms 
of advertising and public relations value.230  However, a court is likely 
to uphold EPA’s section 5(b)(4)(A) rule adding chemicals to a 
Chemicals of Concern list regardless of the economic impact of the 
listing, so long as the statutory requirements of section 5(b)(4)(A) 
are met.  Unlike section 6 of TSCA, which explicitly requires that EPA 
consider the balancing of environmental and health concerns versus 
economic impact,231 section 5(b)(4)(A) explicitly requires EPA to 
consider only two factors:  1) the effects of a chemical substance on 
health and 2) the effects of such substance on the environment.232  In 
section 5(b)(4)(A), Congress does not explicitly require EPA to 
consider effects other than those on health and the environment as it 
does in section 6, and therefore a court is unlikely to fault EPA for 
basing its listing determination on non-economic factors.233 
                                                          
phthalates_ap_2009_1230_final.pdf (describing a plan to regulate chemicals that are 
“produced in high volume, over 470 million pounds per year”). 
 227. See id. (noting that according to Center for Disease Control studies, “[a] 
number of phthalates appear in biomonitoring surveys of human tissues, evidencing 
widespread human exposure”). 
 228. Ausimont, 838 F.2d at 96.  
 229. See U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, supra note 226, at 1 (stating various health risks 
associated with exposure to phthalates). 
 230. See Charles M. Auer et al., TSCA Section 5(b)(4) ‘Chemicals of Concern’ List:  
Questions, Issues, Concerns, B.N.A. DAILY ENV’T REP., May 24, 2010, at B-4 (observing 
that similar lists created pursuant to other laws have had far-reaching effects, 
including publication of the lists by environmental groups and states using the list as 
a basis to ban a chemical). 
 231. See TSCA § 6(c)(1)(C)–(D), 15 U.S.C. § 2605(c)(1)(C)–(D) (2006) 
(requiring that EPA consider “the benefits of such substance or mixture for various 
uses and the availability of substitutes for such uses, and . . . the reasonably 
ascertainable economic consequences of the rule, after consideration of the effect on 
the national economy, small business, technological innovation, the environment, 
and public health”). 
 232. Id. § 5(b)(4)(A)(ii). 
 233. Compare id. § 5(b)(4)(A)(ii) (failing to include economic factors as a 
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In sum, the creation of a Chemicals of Concern list is within EPA’s 
authority, and courts should uphold EPA’s action in creating such a 
list if challenged.  The creation of this list presents an opportunity for 
the Agency to draw further attention to the threats of certain 
chemicals.  This list can serve as a tool to raise public awareness about 
the risks of harm from certain chemicals, as adding chemicals to the 
list is likely to gain media attention.  EPA’s announcement that it was 
targeting certain chemicals for potential addition prompted 
widespread media coverage, including discussion of the threats of 
BPA, PBDE, and phthalates.234  Media coverage of EPA’s decision to 
list BPA as a potential “chemical of concern” included information 
about the threat of BPA (including heart disease and cancer), its 
prevalence (“90 percent of Americans show traces of it in their 
urine”), and how it can be avoided (by refusing to use hard plastic 
food and drink containers that are not labeled BPA-free).235  Thus, 
EPA’s use of its section 5(b)(4)(A) authority has the potential to 
serve as an important catalyst for consumer awareness about the 
harm posed by various chemicals. 
C. Corrosion Proof Fittings Revisited:  Why a Judicial Activist Decision 
Should Not Prevent EPA from Using Its Section 6 Authority Today 
In its Chemical Action Plans, EPA has announced its intention to 
use its section 6 authority with renewed and unprecedented vigor, 
proposing to regulate phthalates, which pose potentially serious 
threats to male reproductive systems and to child development; long-
chain perfluorinated chemicals (PFCs), which have been shown to be 
toxic to wildlife; and short-chain chlorinated paraffins (SCCPs), 
among others.236  EPA’s Chemical Action Plans have generated rapt 
attention in the TSCA community because EPA has not used its 
section 6 authority to ban a chemical since the Fifth Circuit’s 
rejection of EPA’s asbestos ban in Corrosion Proof Fittings.237  This case 
                                                          
consideration), with id. § 6(c)(1)(D) (explicitly requiring EPA to consider economic 
factors in addition to effects on health and the environment). 
 234. See, e.g., David A. Fahrenthold, EPA Calls BPA a ‘Chemical of Concern’, WASH. 
POST, Mar. 30, 2010, at A9; Elana Schor, Enviro Groups Press for Expanded EPA Oversight 
of Household Toxins, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 19, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/ 
gwire/2010/10/19/19greenwire-enviro-groups-press-for-expanded-epa-oversight-
17542.html (noting the existence of “a growing body of scientific literature 
indicating that phthalates interfere with endocrine and reproductive functioning,” 
and that EPA has begun the process of regulating these chemicals). 
 235. Schor, supra note 234. 
 236. See Auer et al., supra note 148, at 10,243 (noting that “EPA has never 
previously announced so many actions under [TSCA], nor has it ever cited use of § 6 
so widely”). 
 237. See EPA Issues Four Chemical Action Plans Under TSCA, BEVERIDGE & DIAMOND, 
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has been called a “death knell” for EPA’s attempts to use section 6 to 
ban chemicals under TSCA.238  However, the Fifth Circuit’s use of the 
“substantial evidence” standard of review in Corrosion Proof Fittings was 
erroneously invasive.  Subsequent reviews of EPA’s use of its section 6 
authority should be more deferential to the Agency to increase the 
chance that such rules will be upheld.  
In its review of EPA’s proposed asbestos ban, the Fifth Circuit 
inserted requirements into section 6 of TSCA which neither the 
language of the statute, nor its legislative history, support.239  Section 
19 of TSCA provides that a reviewing court shall hold unlawful and 
set aside a section 6 rule if the court determines that, upon review of 
the record, the rule is not supported by substantial evidence.240  In 
Corrosion Proof Fittings, the Fifth Circuit correctly summarized the 
Supreme Court’s statement in Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB241 that 
substantial evidence means “such relevant evidence as a reasonable 
mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.”242  The 
court also correctly pointed out that substantial evidence review 
enables courts to exert greater scrutiny of agency decision-making 
than arbitrary and capricious review, and requires “careful scrutiny” 
of agency findings.243  Despite its accurate summary of the 
requirements of substantial evidence review, the Fifth Circuit erred in 
its application of this standard to the facts of the case before it. 
In evaluating whether EPA had met the requirements of section 6, 
so as to trigger its authority to ban a chemical, the Fifth Circuit went 
beyond a searching review for “substantial evidence” and instead read 
requirements into the statute that were neither included nor 
                                                          
P.C. (Jan. 5, 2010), http://www.bdlaw.com/assets/attachments/2010-01-
05%20BD%20Client%20Alert%20-%20EPA%20Issues%20Four%20Chemical% 
20Action%20Plans%20Under%20TSCA.pdf (observing that “[t]his is the first time 
EPA has proposed significant actions under TSCA § 6(a) . . . since the asbestos ban 
was invalidated in 1991”). 
 238. Noah Sachs, Blocked Pathways:  Potential Legal Responses to Endocrine Disrupting 
Chemicals, 24 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 289, 324 (1999) (quoting DAN FAGIN & MARIANNE 
LAVELLE, TOXIC DECEPTION:  HOW THE CHEMICAL INDUSTRY MANIPULATES SCIENCE, 
BENDS THE LAW, AND ENDANGERS YOUR HEALTH 138 (1996)) (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
 239. Compare TSCA § 6(c), 15 U.S.C. § 2605(c) (2006) (requiring only that EPA 
issue reports on the effects of substances on the environment and people, and the 
economic consequences of the rule), with Corrosion Proof Fittings v. EPA, 947 F.2d 
1201, 1217 (5th Cir. 1991) (“[T]he EPA must show not only that its proposed action 
reduces the risk of the product to an adequate level, but also that the actions 
Congress identified as less burdensome also would not do the job.”). 
 240. TSCA § 19(c)(1)(B)(i). 
 241. 340 U.S. 474 (1951). 
 242. Id. at 477 (quoting Consol. Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 229 (1938)) 
(internal quotation marks omitted). 
 243. Corrosion Proof Fittings, 947 F.2d at 1213–14. 
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intended by Congress.  Specifically, the court interpreted section 6 as 
requiring that EPA must make a showing, after it has chosen what it 
considers to be the least burdensome regulatory option to address a 
chemical’s risk, that each of the other six alternatives in the statute 
are not also sufficient to reduce that risk.244  Section 6 of TSCA directs 
EPA to regulate a chemical “to the extent necessary to protect 
adequately against [health and environmental] risk using the least 
burdensome requirements.”245  The statute does not mandate that 
EPA apply any particular methodology or formula in determining 
whether the regulation it has chosen is the “least burdensome” 
option.246  This requirement imposed by the court, though not 
required by the statute, could be seen as the equivalent of what courts 
should look for when evaluating a section 6 rule under substantial 
evidence review.247  However, the court then went a step further, 
outside the bounds of substantial evidence review, to require that 
EPA make this showing using cost-benefit analysis.248   
In imposing the requirement that EPA make a quantitative 
showing as to why each possible alternative to its intended regulation 
will not also protect against risk, the Fifth Circuit went beyond the 
already stringent mandate that Congress gave to EPA in TSCA by 
creating its own artificial requirement.249  While the Supreme Court 
has noted that substantial evidence review is more invasive than 
traditional arbitrary and capricious review,250 it does not follow that 
this form of review enables courts to impose judicially-created 
requirements on agencies, outside of what is already required of 
                                                          
 244. Id. at 1217. 
 245. TSCA § 6(a). 
 246. Id.; see, e.g., Thomas O. McGarity, The Courts and the Ossification of Rulemaking:  
A Response to Professor Seidenfeld, 75 TEX. L. REV. 525, 546 (1997) (arguing that in 
Corrosion Proof Fittings, the court “clearly failed to give any deference to EPA’s 
interpretation of its statute and it arguably misinterpreted the statute when it alluded 
to ‘TSCA’s requirement that [EPA’s] alternative be the least burdensome of all those 
offered to it’” (quoting Corrosion Proof Fittings, 947 F.2d at 1216)). 
 247. By requiring EPA to document why it did not choose each of the other 
regulatory alternatives in the statute, the court ensured that EPA is essentially 
populating the record with documentation that its chosen regulation is supported by 
substantial evidence.  See TSCA § 19. 
 248. Corrosion Proof Fittings, 947 F.2d at 1222. 
 249. There is no requirement in section 6 of the TSCA that EPA must individually 
evaluate each of the seven regulatory options listed in that section.  See TSCA § 6(a).  
Rather, the findings that the statute does require EPA to produce are explicitly listed 
in section 6(c).  Id. § 6(c) (listing the following requirements:  (1) the effects of 
substances on people; (2) the effects of substances on the environment; (3) the 
benefits of substances and the substances’ substitutes; and (4) the reasonably 
ascertainable economic consequences of the rule). 
 250. See Abbott Labs. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 143 (1967) (noting that the 
substantial evidence test affords a “considerably more generous judicial review than 
the ‘arbitrary and capricious’ test”). 
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them by the statutes they are charged with implementing.  Rather, 
this standard explicitly requires a court to review the record for 
substantial evidence to support EPA’s determination that a ban is 
“the least burdensome requirement[]” that is “necessary to protect 
adequately” against chemical risk.251  Nowhere in the statute does 
Congress require that EPA accompany this finding with extensive 
evaluations of the quantitative costs and benefits of each possible 
alternative.252   
Here, the Fifth Circuit found that “[m]uch of EPA’s analysis” 
necessitating the ban was correct,253 and acknowledged that “EPA 
mentions the problems posed by intermediate levels of regulation.”254  
This finding alone—that EPA’s analysis supporting the ban was 
“correct” and that EPA reasoned through why lower levels of 
regulation would not suffice—appears to meet the Supreme Court’s 
requirement in Universal Camera that “such relevant evidence as a 
reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion” 
be present.255  Yet, rather than applying the Supreme Court’s test, the 
Fifth Circuit faulted EPA for failing “to calculate the costs and 
benefits of these intermediate levels [of regulation].”256  While EPA is 
statutorily required to choose the “least burdensome requirement[],” 
it is not required to conduct a cost-benefit analysis of each regulatory 
option presented to it.257 
The court itself noted earlier in its opinion that “[a]n agency may 
exercise its judgment without strictly relying upon quantifiable risks, 
costs, and benefits” so long as the agency explains why it made the 
decision it did, and shows a rational connection between the facts at 
issue and its choice of regulation.258  By evaluating the problems with 
lesser levels of regulation, EPA met this requirement.  Further, the 
Supreme Court has held that “[w]hen Congress has intended that an 
agency engage in cost-benefit analysis, it has clearly indicated such 
intent on the face of the statute.”259  Here, rather than expressing its 
intent that EPA conduct a cost-benefit analysis before issuing a 
                                                          
 251. TSCA § 6(a). 
 252. Id. § 6(c). 
 253. Corrosion Proof Fittings, 947 F.2d at 1216. 
 254. Id. at 1217. 
 255. Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 477 (1951) (quoting Consol. 
Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 229 (1938)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 256. Corrosion Proof Fittings, 947 F.2d at 1217. 
 257. See TSCA § 6(a) (requiring that EPA use the “least burdensome 
requirement[]” to address chemical risk, but at no point specifying the manner in 
which EPA must make this choice). 
 258. Corrosion Proof Fittings, 947 F.2d at 1214. 
 259. Am. Textile Mfrs. Inst., Inc. v. Donovan, 452 U.S. 490, 510 (1981). 
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section 6 rule, Congress stated that the balancing process inherent in 
making “a determination that a risk associated with a chemical 
substance . . . is unreasonable involves balancing . . . [but] does not 
require a formal benefit-cost analysis under which a monetary value is 
assigned to the risks associated.”260 
Contrary to the court’s conclusion that EPA must consider and 
reject each less burdensome form of regulation based on quantitative 
data,261 the legislative history of section 6 indicates that Congress did 
not intend for EPA to undertake this level of exhaustive quantitative 
analysis.  The TSCA House Report specifically stated that Congress 
did not intend for necessary regulation to “be unreasonably delayed 
while the Administrator develops quantative [sic] data comparing the 
costs of control methods.”262  Rather, members of Congress expected 
that “the determination of the least burdensome requirement 
w[ould] be based on information submitted to the Administration 
during the rulemaking proceeding and other information which is 
readily available.”263  Congress intended for EPA to base its analysis on 
the resources the agency had on hand, and not on drawn out cost 
projections that fail to quantify qualitative benefits of the rule.264  
Thus, in Corrosion Proof Fittings, the Fifth Circuit’s review of EPA’s 
asbestos ban exceeded what is required by both the statute itself and 
Congress’s expressed intentions in the statute’s legislative history. 
If EPA determines that any of the chemicals currently poised for 
section 6 action in its Chemical Action Plans “present[] or will 
present an unreasonable risk of injury to health or the environment,” 
it should proceed with whichever regulatory option it finds is 
“necessary to protect adequately against such risk” and is the “least 
burdensome.”265  A reviewing court should not hold EPA to the Fifth 
Circuit’s non-statutorily based requirement—that EPA bears the 
burden of performing a full cost-benefit analysis for each alternative 
listed in section 6 before its chosen regulation can be upheld.  
Though TSCA does require that EPA choose the “least burdensome 
                                                          
 260. See H.R. REP. NO. 94-1341, at 14 (1976), reprinted in H. COMM. ON INTERSTATE 
AND FOREIGN COMMERCE, 94TH CONG., LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE TOXIC SUBSTANCES 
CONTROL ACT, at 408 (Comm. Print 1976) (noting that “a risk associated with a 
chemical substance or mixture is unreasonable [if] the probability that harm will 
occur and the magnitude or severity of that harm [outweighs] the effect of proposed 
regulatory action on the availability to society of the benefits of the substance or 
mixture”). 
 261. Corrosion Proof Fittings, 947 F.2d at 1217, 1228. 
 262. H.R. REP. NO. 94-1341, at 34. 
 263. Id. (emphases added). 
 264. Id. 
 265. TSCA § 6(a), 15 U.S.C. § 2605(a) (2006). 
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requirement[],” it does not require EPA to substantiate that choice 
by quantitatively and extensively analyzing the costs and benefits of 
each option.266  EPA is required to support its choice of the “least 
burdensome” regulatory option by “substantial evidence,” which the 
Supreme Court defined as evidence that “a reasonable mind might 
accept as adequate to support a conclusion.”267   
For the foregoing reasons, the thorough consideration, rationale, 
and analysis accompanying EPA’s rejection of lesser measures in 
Corrosion Proof Fittings should be enough to adequately support any 
future regulations imposed by EPA under section 6.  As noted by the 
Congress that passed TSCA, it was not Congress’s intent that “needed 
regulation be unreasonably delayed while the Administrator develops 
quantative [sic] data comparing the costs of control methods.”268  
Rather, the likely regulatory actions posed by the current EPA should 
be upheld so long as they are issued in conformity with the statute’s 
requirements, which do not include extensive, highly detailed, and 
purely quantitative cost-benefit analysis to make a showing that the 
“least burdensome” alternative has been selected. 
III. TSCA’S PREEMPTION PROVISION ALLOWS STATES TO TAKE BROAD 
ACTION TO REGULATE CHEMICALS 
TSCA’s preemption provision, found in section 18, allows states to 
freely regulate chemicals so long as EPA has not yet acted to regulate 
them.269  However, even if EPA has taken regulatory action under 
section 5 or section 6 of TSCA, state laws regulating the same 
chemicals are not preempted so long as they match whatever 
requirement has been promulgated by EPA, or are more stringent 
(meaning they ban the chemical substance entirely).270  TSCA’s 
expansive preemption provision is the first place that a reviewing 
court will look in determining whether a state law is preempted.271  
Because this provision expressly allows that, unless EPA has already 
taken action, “nothing . . . shall affect the authority of any State or 
                                                          
 266. Id. 
 267. Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 477 (1951) (quoting Consol. 
Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 229 (1938)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 268. H.R. REP. NO. 94-1341, at 34 (1976), reprinted in H. COMM. ON INTERSTATE AND 
FOREIGN COMMERCE, 94TH CONG., LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE TOXIC SUBSTANCES 
CONTROL ACT, at 427 (Comm. Print 1976).   
 269. TSCA § 18(a). 
 270. Id. § 18(a)(2)(B). 
 271. See CSX Transp., Inc. v. Easterwood, 507 U.S. 658, 664 (1993) (observing that 
if a statute contains an express preemption clause, a court should first “focus on the 
plain wording of the clause, which necessarily contains the best evidence of 
Congress’s pre-emptive intent”).   
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political subdivision of a State to establish or continue in effect 
regulation of any chemical substance,”272 states have broad leeway in 
regulating chemicals that they determine pose a risk to their 
populations or environment.  Under this provision, the fact that EPA 
has regulated only five chemicals to date273 lends itself to even 
broader state action.274   
States have used their essentially unlimited (due to lack of 
regulation at the federal level) authority to regulate chemicals with 
much greater frequency than has occurred under TSCA,275 and courts 
should allow states to continue to do so under TSCA’s current 
preemption provision.  Further, the regulations that states have 
issued have in many instances succeeded at regulating chemical risks 
where TSCA has failed.276  For example, one of the earliest state toxic 
laws, California’s Proposition 65 (passed as a ballot initiative in 1986), 
requires that the Governor of California once a year “cause to be 
published a list of those chemicals known to the state to cause cancer 
or reproductive toxicity.”277  It also requires businesses to provide 
consumers, or others exposed to their products, with a “clear and 
reasonable warning” if their products contain a listed chemical.278  
Thus, without violating TSCA’s preemption provision, California has 
required warning labels for over 800 chemicals known to cause 
cancer and reproductive toxicity.279 
Other states have followed in California’s footsteps and regulated 
chemical manufacturers or producers outside the void of action 
under TSCA, and these actions are similarly permitted under TSCA’s 
                                                          
 272. TSCA § 18(a). 
 273. See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 75, at 58–60 (noting that to 
date EPA has regulated five chemicals under section 6). 
 274. While there have been no preemption challenges to EPA action under the 
TSCA’s main title (for the reasons discussed in this Part), there have been a number 
of challenges to state laws regulating polychlorinated biphenyls (PCBs).  See, e.g., City 
of Chesapeake v. Sutton Enters., Inc. 138 F.R.D. 468, 477–78 (E.D. Va. 1990).  
Because PCBs were a known risk at the time of the TSCA’s passage, Congress created 
an explicit federal scheme to manage the use and disposal of PCBs.  TSCA § 6(e); 40 
C.F.R. pt. 761 (2010).  State laws imposing lesser PCB requirements are preempted 
by the extensive federal regulation.  See, e.g, City of Chesapeake, 138 F.R.D. at 477. 
 275. See BELLIVEAU, supra note 13, at 6 (observing that “18 states have passed 71 
chemical safety laws in the last eight years”). 
 276. See, e.g., CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 25249.8 (West 2006) (requiring 
labeling of products containing chemicals identified as carcinogenic or toxic); ME. 
REV. STAT. tit. 38, § 1691 to 1699-B (2010) (granting the state authority to ban 
chemicals that are identified as hazardous to children). 
 277. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 25249.8(a). 
 278. Id. § 25249.6.   
 279. Proposition 65 in Plain Language!, CAL. OFFICE OF ENVTL. HEALTH HAZARD 
ASSESSMENT, http://oehha.ca.gov/prop65/background/p65plain.html (last updated 
Mar. 2010). 
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preemption provision.  In 2007, Maine adopted the Toxic Chemicals 
in Children’s Products Law,280 which—like California’s Proposition 
65—requires the state environmental department to “publish a list of 
chemicals of high concern.”281  The basis for this list is whether 
chemicals are:  “[A] [a] carcinogen, a reproductive or developmental 
toxicant or an endocrine disruptor; [B] [p]ersistent, bioaccumulative 
and toxic; or [C] [v]ery persistent and very bioaccumulative.”282   
Section 5(b)(4)(A) of TSCA similarly enables EPA to publish a list 
of hazardous chemicals; however, EPA may only list chemicals that 
pose an “unreasonable risk.”283  Under the Maine Toxic Chemicals in 
Children’s Products Law, there is no qualifier for the risk of a 
chemical:  so long as the chemical has any of the specified effects, it 
can be added to the list.284  It is of no consequence that the risk may 
be minute; as long as it is present, the state can make it known to the 
public.285  Even once EPA issues its final Chemicals of Concern list,286 
lists like Maine’s, California’s, and any other states’, will not be 
preempted.287  Section 18 requires that if EPA has issued a rule under 
section 5 addressing a certain chemical, a state rule also addressing 
that chemical will be upheld so long as it is consistent with and as 
stringent as EPA’s rule.288  Because both the Maine statute and section 
5(b)(4)(a) similarly result in the creation of a list, any chemical that 
is listed by both the state and EPA will therefore be subject to 
identical treatment.289  Therefore, any state law that requires the 
listing of a chemical also listed by EPA will likely be upheld. 
After the list is set, the Maine Toxic Chemicals in Children’s 
Products Law then places an affirmative duty on manufacturers to 
notify the department regarding their production and use of the 
                                                          
 280. ME. REV. STAT. tit. 38, § 1691 to 1699-B. 
 281. Id. § 1693(1). 
 282. Id.   
 283. TSCA § 5(b)(4)(A)(i), 15 U.S.C. § 2604(b)(4)(A)(i) (2006); see also supra 
Part II.B (discussing the scope of EPA’s ability to create a list of hazardous 
chemicals). 
 284. ME. REV. STAT. tit. 38, § 1693(1). 
 285. See id. (providing that the state “shall publish a list of chemicals of high 
concern,” which means any chemical that on the “basis of credible scientific 
evidence” has been determined to cause cancer or disrupt endocrine or hormonal 
systems, is “[p]ersistent, bioaccumulative and toxic,” or is “[v]ery persistent and very 
bioaccumulative”).  
 286. See supra Part II.B (discussing EPA’s plan to issue a “Chemicals of Concern” 
list). 
 287. See TSCA § 18(a) (establishing that no state law shall be preempted unless 
EPA has enacted a similar requirement, in which case the state requirement must be 
“identical,” adopted under the Clean Air Act, or be a blanket prohibition of the 
chemical). 
 288. Id. 
 289. See id.   
TREVISAN.OFF.TO.PRINTER (DO NOT DELETE) 3/26/2012 8:12 PM 
2011] HUMAN HEALTH AND THE ENVIRONMENT CAN’T WAIT 427 
listed chemical.290  Unlike TSCA, this law does not require notification 
only of the production of new chemicals and existing chemicals put 
to a “significant new use,” but of all chemicals contained on the 
priority list.291  The fact that TSCA distinguishes between new and 
existing chemicals, allowing greater leeway for the untested 
production of chemicals that existed when TSCA passed, has been a 
frequent point of criticism.292  State laws have responded—as Maine’s 
Toxic Chemicals in Children’s Products Law demonstrates—by 
regulating all chemicals alike and not allowing one group to escape 
regulation.293  
The Toxic Chemicals in Children’s Products Law also provides that 
the state can decide to “prohibit[] the manufacture, sale or 
distribution in the State” of a listed chemical if it finds that children 
or other vulnerable populations are exposed to the chemical and that 
a safer alternative is available.294  Unlike in TSCA where there is a 
requirement to choose the “least burdensome requirement[],”295 here 
the state is directed to identify the safest alternatives to chemical 
risks.296  The statute directs manufacturers of children’s products that 
contain hazardous chemicals to comply by either:  (1) substituting a 
safer alternative in the product or (2) discontinuing sales of the 
product altogether.297  This provision, which allows the state to ban 
the use of a chemical where a safer alternative is unavailable, is well 
within TSCA’s preemption clause, which states that even where EPA 
has promulgated a section 5 or section 6 rule regulating a substance, 
a state ban of that substance is not preempted.298   
TSCA’s preemption provision grants states generous authority to 
regulate chemical risks within their borders.  If EPA follows through 
with its proposed section 6 actions, which include potential bans,299 
                                                          
 290. ME. REV. STAT. tit. 38, § 1695(1). 
 291. TSCA § 5(a)(1)(B).  
 292. See Greenwood, supra note 205, at 10,040 (describing the “fundamental 
problem[s] inherent in a regulatory program built around a distinction between 
things new and existing”). 
 293. ME. REV. STAT. tit. 38, § 1691 to 1699-B. 
 294. Id. § 1696(1). 
 295. TSCA § 6(a). 
 296. ME. REV. STAT. tit. 38, § 1696(1)(B). 
 297. Id. § 1696. 
 298. TSCA § 18(a)(2)(B) (stating that where “the Administrator prescribes a rule 
or order under section [5] or [6] . . . “no State . . . may . . . establish or continue in 
effect any requirement which is applicable to such substance or mixture . . . unless 
such requirement . . . (iii) prohibits the use or such substance or mixture in such 
State”). 
 299. See Existing Chemicals Action Plans, supra note 153 (stating that EPA is 
considering banning a number of chemicals under its section 6 authority, including 
phthalates). 
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those bans would preempt any state laws regarding the banned 
chemicals only if the state laws were less stringent.  However, as many 
state laws include bans and other strong regulations,300 it is likely that 
even with aggressive federal action, state laws would still be upheld 
under TSCA’s preemption provision. 
CONCLUSION 
Chemicals are an ever-present and fully integrated part of the 
fabric of American life.  Some of the risks of commonly used 
chemicals were known at the time of TSCA’s passage, and more are 
known now.  However, many of these risks have come to light not 
through statutorily required testing performed by chemical 
manufacturers, but rather through independent studies that find 
dangers to humans and the environment after the harmful effects of 
chemicals are already occurring.301  Historically, under the current 
version of TSCA, once these risks became known, attempts at 
regulating them proved too difficult to undertake.302 
However, this Comment argues that the current Toxic Substances 
Control Act gives EPA the legal authority to:  require additional 
testing of the most prevalent chemicals using section 4; draw 
attention to chemical risks using section 5; and regulate hazardous 
chemicals using section 6.  These steps, and others that EPA is 
currently undertaking,303 are essential to protect public health and 
the environment from chemical risks in the near term.  In each of the 
sections of TSCA addressed in this Comment, EPA has substantial 
discretion to exercise its authority, and courts are likely to recognize 
                                                          
 300. See BELLIVEAU, supra note 13, at 12–13 (listing eighteen states that have 
banned or phased out hazardous chemicals). 
 301. For example, BPA existed at the time of TSCA’s passage; however, no test 
rule was ever issued to determine the risks that it posed.  Instead, these risks came to 
light through a series of independent and government studies.  See Kolbert, supra 
note 117 (summarizing the work of a prominent BPA researcher, including a 
sequence of studies drawing attention to the risks of BPA); see also Houlihan et al., 
supra note 119 (chronicling the history of BPA). 
 302. See supra Part I.B (discussing the hurdles to using the regulatory authority 
granted to EPA by TSCA). 
 303. On February 10, 2011, EPA notified five chemical manufacturers that 
information about their products which they claimed constituted “Confidential 
Business Information” (CBI), and was thus exempt from public disclosure, was not in 
fact CBI.  Press Release, U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, EPA Removes Confidentiality 
Claims on Studies of Chemicals Submitted Under TSCA (Feb. 10, 2011), 
http://yosemite.epa.gov/opa/admpress.nsf/d0cf6618525a9efb85257359003fb69d/f
b73e2f72dc2fc98852578330053cf62!OpenDocument.  EPA announced that this 
“critical health and safety information” would now be released to the public.  Id.  
While this action is outside the scope of this Comment, it is indicative of EPA’s 
continued work to assert its TSCA authority. 
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and uphold EPA’s use of this discretion.304  Despite TSCA’s flaws, EPA 
does have the legal authority to prevent the general public and the 
environment from continuing to be a “laboratory for discovering 
adverse health effects” of hazardous chemicals.305 
Further, this Comment also argues that TSCA’s section 18 express 
preemption provision allows for expansive state action to build on 
what the federal government is able to do using the latter sources of 
authority.  States such as California, Maine, and many others306 have 
passed legislation that does what the federal government has not:  
ban the use of dangerous chemicals,307 as well as enable state 
environmental agencies to choose the safest alternative—as opposed 
to the “least burdensome”308—when regulating a chemical.309  This 
combination of federal tools and state action can serve as an 
important step toward the preventative and responsive approach to 
chemical regulation that the 1971 CEQ Toxic Substances report 
envisioned.310 
However, while this Comment argues that chemical regulation can 
and should occur now—before reform bills are passed in several (or 
perhaps many) years—it also acknowledges that reform is the best 
option for achieving TSCA’s goals of a preventative and readily 
responsive system of chemical regulation.  Though EPA does have 
legal authority to issue section 4 test rules to obtain information 
about highly prevalent chemicals and to issue section 6 regulations, 
including bans, EPA still must face the built-in procedural hurdles 
contained in these sections of the statute; namely, the extensive 
rulemaking requirements that EPA must comply with.311  In a 2005 
report to Congress, the Government Accountability Office noted 
that, according to EPA officials, “finalizing rules under section 4 of 
TSCA can take from 2 to 10 years and require the expenditure of 
substantial resources.”312  In 1994, EPA officials estimated that test 
rules could cost the Agency as much as $250,000 to issue.313  Similar 
costs and hurdles face EPA in issuing a section 6 rule, even without 
                                                          
 304. Supra Part II. 
 305. COUNCIL ON ENVTL. QUALITY, supra note 4, at 21. 
 306. Supra Part III; see also BELLIVEAU, supra note 13 (analyzing state efforts to 
regulate chemicals in the absence of federal regulation). 
 307. ME. REV. STAT. tit. 38, § 1696 (2010). 
 308. TSCA § 6(a), 15 U.S.C. § 2605(a) (2006). 
 309. Id.  
 310. COUNCIL ON ENVTL. QUALITY, supra note 4, at 21 (commenting that through 
TSCA, the government would “no longer be limited to repairing damage after it 
ha[d] been done”). 
 311. Supra Part I.B.1. 
 312. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 75, at 26. 
 313. Id. 
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the cost-benefit analysis erroneously required by the Fifth Circuit.  
These procedural obstacles, and the burden placed on EPA to go 
after chemical manufacturers for data, as opposed to the 
manufacturers sending data to EPA,314 make the current legal 
authority difficult to use. 
While these procedural obstacles are legally surmountable,315 doing 
so requires expenditures of significant resources and time.316  Despite 
EPA’s legal authority to take action to address chemical risks, 
alleviating the burdens inherent in the current law would make EPA’s 
task more efficient, and likely more effective.  Both the House and 
Senate reform bills work to remove these obstacles,317 and thus create 
a more fluid and readily adaptable regulatory scheme than currently 
exists.  States have voiced their support for reform, and they are 
awaiting a uniform federal standard that will not necessitate the 
extensive patchwork of state laws currently in place.318  While EPA and 
the states can and should use their authority under TSCA to take 
steps toward chemical regulation, reform is necessary to transition 
from a relatively less-efficient approach under the current law to a 
streamlined and efficient system of chemical management via the 
proposed reforms. 
                                                          
 314. See supra Part I.C.2 (giving an overview of the major differences between 
TSCA and the House and Senate reform bills, including the requirement in the 
reform bills that manufacturers have an affirmative duty to send health and safety 
data to EPA, and further that EPA can require additional data via an order, which is 
much less cumbersome than a rule). 
 315. See supra Part II (arguing that EPA does have legal authority to take steps to 
require additional testing, draw attention to chemical risks, and issue bans or other 
chemical regulation).  
 316. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 75, at 26.  
 317. Supra Part I.C.2. 
 318. Resolution Urging Congress to Reform the Toxic Substances Control Act, ENVTL. 
COUNCIL OF THE STATES (Aug. 30 2010), http://www.ecos.org/section/committees/ 
cross_media. 
